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ABSTRACT 
 Researchers in cognitive neuroscience have used brain-imaging methods (e.g., EEG, 
fMRI) to investigate the neural correlates of creative cognition and have found increased 
activity in the alpha frequency band (Fink et al., 2009a, 2009b; Martindale, 1975), however 
few studies have used neuroscientific measures to investigate artistic creativity.  Such studies 
are valuable because they share a characteristic of ecological validity.  In this study I used 
EEG, the Alternate Uses Test (Guilford, 1967), and the Consensual Assessment Technique 
(Amabile, 1982) to substantiate a conceptualization of creativity as a mental state 
characterized by a distinct pattern of neural activity. The participants were musicians with 
and without previous formal institutional training in improvisation.  Amongst those with 
previous training, frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere was greater 
when musicians improvised than when they played back and listened to melodies.  
Originality scores correlated with frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere 
during improvisation, and frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere 
correlated with expert ratings of created products.  The relationship of frontal upper alpha 
synchronization in the right hemisphere during improvisation and the quality of created 
products was mediated by aptitude for originality.  This suggests that training acts as a 
pathway for the development of creative gifts into creative talents observable in the quality of 
created products.  
Keywords 
EEG; Alpha; Frontal Cortex; Creativity; Originality; Divergent Thinking; Innovation; 
Improvisation; Music; Aptitude; Training. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 Researchers in cognitive neuroscience have used brain-imaging methods (e.g., 
EEG, fMRI) to investigate the neural correlates of creative cognition and have found 
increased activity in the alpha frequency band (Fink et al., 2009a, 2009b; Martindale, 
1975; Martindale & Hasenfus, 1978).  Dietrich (2004a) interpreted this pattern of neural 
activity as evidence of a spontaneous processing mode occurring while people are 
engaged in the intuitive processing of thoughts and ideas from the temporal, occipital, 
and parietal lobes into the working memory buffer in the frontal brain area (i.e., 
prefrontal cortex).  Although initially interpreted as cortical idling, recent research has 
shown that increased frontal alpha activity is related to top-down processing, internal 
focus of attention, and sensory inhibition (Buzsaki & Draguhn, 2004; Klimesch et al., 
2007; Ward, 2003).  These processes are reminiscent of improvising artists’ descriptions 
of the creative process (Berkowitz, 2007; Berliner, 1994; Nardone, 1997).  Improvising 
artists specifically have described a dissolution of self, an intuitive mental state, and a 
fluctuation between intuitive and analytic mental states (Nelson & Rawlings, 2007). 
 Few studies have used neuroscientific measures to investigate studies of artistic 
creativity.  Such studies are valuable though because they share a characteristic of 
ecological validity.  Past research on artistic creativity has indicated that the frontal brain 
areas may play a special role in creative cognition, however some researchers have found 
increased alpha activity (Fink, Graif, & Neubauer, 2009) and some decreased alpha 
activity (Petsche, 2002, 2005; Petsche et al., 1997).  These opposing findings may be due 
to the measurement of different types of creativity with some types relying on prefrontal 
engagement and some disengagement (Dietrich & Kanso, 2010).  As such, it is necessary 
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to delineate types of creativity and to measure frontal activity during tasks that facilitate 
the cognitive processing modes specific to these individual subcreativities. 
 In the current study, I developed an experiential state-based conceptualization of 
creativity that is hallmarked by the spontaneous processing of intuitive thoughts and the 
expression of these through a medium in real time.  In brief, I conceptualized creativity as 
a distinct mental state involving improvisation.  The skill of improvisation crosses 
domain boundaries, and is necessary in any field that incorporates adaptation, problem 
solving, and innovation (Limb & Braun, 2008). As a student and teacher, I have noticed a 
lack of opportunity for learners to enter into creative mental states, as well as a lack of 
support and guidance once engaged.  It is my belief that the facilitation of such mental 
states would lead to increased creativity and innovation, especially in learners with 
aptitudes for creativity.  However, it is first essential to investigate whether there is 
neuroscientific evidence that such a creative mental state exists.   
 In this study I used EEG, the Alternate Uses Test (Guilford, 1967), and the 
Consensual Assessment Technique (Amabile, 1982) to substantiate a conceptualization of 
creativity as a mental state characterized by a distinct pattern of neural activity.  Further 
along in this dissertation, EEG is described in more detail in its own section and the 
Alternate Uses Test and the Consensual Assessment Technique are described in detail in 
a section on the assessment of creativity. 
More specifically, the primary aim of this study was to use EEG to investigate 
whether frontal brain wave changes occurring during spontaneous musical creativity are 
different than during non-spontaneous (i.e., deliberate) musical creativity.  Framing this 
aim as a research question, I asked: Does frontal alpha activity correspond to the degree 
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of creativity of different musical tasks?  Differences in brain activity occurring during 
time intervals of spontaneous musical creativity would support my experiential 
conceptualization of creativity.  This conceptualization is outlined in a later section on 
conceptualizations of creativity.  Further, I aimed to investigate the above differences in 
neural activity (i.e., frontal alpha synchronization) in participants with training in 
creativity and participants without training in creativity. 
The second aim of this study was to use EEG and the Alternate Uses Test 
(Guilford, 1967), a measure of divergent thinking, to investigate the relationship between 
frontal alpha activity during music tasks of varying creativity demands (i.e., 
improvisation, deliberate playing, and listening) and aptitudes for divergent thinking and 
originality.  Framed as a research question, I asked: Do aptitudes for divergent thinking 
and originality correlate with frontal alpha activity during tasks of varying creativity 
demands? 
The third aim of this study was to use EEG and the Consensual Assessment 
Technique (Amabile, 1982) to investigate whether alpha activity during spontaneous 
musical composition predicts the quality of an individual’s improvised musical 
performances as rated by domain experts.  Framed as a research question, I asked: Does 
alpha band activity during spontaneous composition predict improvised performance 
quality?  I also aimed to investigate whether this predictive relationship would occur in 
groups with and without formal institutional training in improvisation (FITI). 
The fourth aim of this study was to investigate if aptitude for creativity mediates 
the relationship between frontal alpha activity and improvised performance quality.  
Specifically, I aimed to investigate whether the relationship between frontal alpha 
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synchronization during musical improvisation and expert ratings of improvised musical 
performances persists when controlling for aptitudes for creativity.  Therefore, my fourth 
research question was: Does aptitude for creativity mediate the relationship between 
frontal alpha synchronization during improvisation and quality of improvised 
performances as rated by domain experts? 
 To date, electroencephalogram (EEG) has not been used to measure the neural 
correlates of spontaneous musical composition (i.e., improvisation) during ecologically 
valid music tasks. 
Organization of the Study 
In the first chapter of this dissertation I will follow a line of reasoning that 
underlies my theory that there is a distinct mental state that can be called creativity.  I will 
present (a) various conceptualizations of creativity including my own, (b) previous 
research on brain-wave changes associated with creative cognition, (c) previous findings 
on the heritability of creativity (d) Gagne’s (1997) theory of talent development (e) 
artists’ descriptions of their experiences of the creative process, and (f) a background on 
the assessment of creativity.  In the second chapter I will discuss the methods and 
procedure I employed, and in the third chapter I will present the results of the study.  In 
the fourth chapter I will discuss these results and my interpretations of them and will 
suggest implications of my findings for education, make recommendations for future 
research, and present the limitations of the study.  Finally I will summarize the findings 
and draw conclusions before sharing my hopes for the pragmatic application of this 
dissertation.   
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Literature Review 
Concepts of Creativity - Localizing the Construct 
 Early conceptions of creativity were mystical in orientation, with creativity often 
equated to divinity and seldom differentiated from genius; however, over the past half-
century creativity has most commonly been referred to as divergent thinking or 
originality (Albert & Runco, 1999).  Over this period researchers have conceptualized 
creativity in several ways, defining the construct as a cognitive ability, as a value 
assigned to products, as novelty accepted within a social system, as a personality 
dimension, and as a mode of being.  In the coming sections I will outline these 
conceptualizations. 
The cognitive ability orientation.  In a seminal address to the American 
Psychological Association (APA), J. P. Guilford (1950) suggested that creativity is an 
aptitude occurring in all humans that is psychometrically measurable and worthy of study 
(as cited in Sternberg & Lubart, 1999).  This suggestion has influenced decades of 
research on the cognitive abilities underlying creative ideation.   
Soon thereafter, Osborn (1953) defined creativity as ideation ability, whereby 
creativity was quantified by measuring the number of possibilities an individual could 
generate regarding the uses of a common object (as cited in Sternberg & Lubart, 1999).  
A number of years later, Paul Torrance (1974) developed the Torrance Tests of Creative 
Thinking (TTCT).  These assessments involved both divergent thinking and problem 
solving tasks, and was scored for (a) quantity of responses (i.e., fluency), (b) variety of 
types of responses (i.e., flexibility), (c) rarity of responses (i.e., statistical originality), and 
(d) amount of detail (i.e., elaboration; Sternberg & Lubart, 1999).  Assessments such as 
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those involved in the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking aimed at measuring individual 
cognitive abilities, thereby assigning statistically reliable normative values about an 
individual’s capacity to think in novel and original ways.  Originality here is defined as 
ideas that are substantially unique in comparison to the norm.  As such, in the cognitive 
ability conceptualization of creativity individuals can be labeled as being of low, average, 
or high creativity.  This psychometric perspective can therefore be said to conceptualize 
“being creative” as a value laden label assigned to an individual based on that person’s 
aptitude for divergent thinking and originality (i.e., inherent creativity).  Under this 
implicit understanding of the way the world is (i.e., ontology), creativity is 
conceptualized as located within the individual’s mind, and as a product of objective, 
normatively valued cognitive abilities. 
The product orientation.  Some researchers (Amabile, 1983; Sternberg, 1986) 
objected to the reliance on psychometric measures of creativity in assessing creativity, 
arguing that these are limited in nature.  These researchers advocated for the adjudication 
of samples of actual creative work by domain experts as essential to the determination of 
creativity.  In accord with these sentiments, MacKinnon (1978) and Runco (1989a) 
suggested that analysis of the creative product is central to the measurement of creativity. 
Whereas Guilford (1950), Torrance (1974), and their supporters defined creativity as the 
sum of cognitive abilities residing within an individual, other researchers (Amabile, 
1983; Mackinnon,1978; Runco, 1989a; Taylor, 1960; Treffinger & Poggio, 1972; 
Wallach, 1976) broadened this definition to include artifacts (i.e., evidence of creativity).  
This second wave of researchers located creativity as embedded in the creative product.  
Although both the cognitive ability and product orientations define, locate, and measure 
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creativity differently, they are commensurable in that their concepts share the implicit 
notion of creativity as an assigned social value. 
The systems approach.  Csikszentmihalyi’s (1988) systems approach to 
creativity elaborated the product orientation to creativity by delineating the features 
responsible for the acceptance or rejection of a creative idea or product within a bound 
social system.  He offered distinct definitions of terms such as the domain and the field 
and in doing so explained the roles of culture and society as they affect creativity. 
Csikszentmihalyi (1999) defined a field as the group of individuals that compose a 
domain.  These individuals collectively act as gatekeepers who decide upon whether a 
new idea or product will be accepted in a specific area of study: a domain.  
Csikszentmihalyi’s (1999) model is a tri-partite one.  Along with the (a) cultural and (b) 
societal, he also included (c) intra-personal factors (i.e., factors located within an 
individual’s psychological make-up) in pre-disposing individuals towards having their 
products or ideas accepted in a domain (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999).   
Experiential orientations. The most well known experiential conceptualization 
of creativity is Csikszentmihalyi’s (1996) concept of flow. My own personal definition of 
creativity is also an experiential state-based one, as I conceptualize creativity as a unique 
mental state characterized by a distinct cognitive processing mode (i.e., spontaneous 
processing).  Although there are some similarities between Csikszentmihalyi’s definition 
and my own, there are also notable differences.  Before comparing the two concepts, I 
will describe the features of both. 
Csikszentmihalyi’s flow theory. Csikszentmihalyi (1996) gave the name flow to 
the sensation workers in a variety of domains have described as enjoyable ease while 
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engaging in performing a task.  He conceptualized creativity and flow as two separate 
phenomena, defining creativity as the creation of novelty, and flow as the mental state 
wherein individuals experience “an almost automatic, effortless, yet highly focused state 
of consciousness” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, p. 110).  According to his theory, any task 
can be an opportunity for flow if the parameters for flow are followed or are present. 
My experiential state-based concept of creativity. I conceptualize creativity as a 
distinct mental state that includes (a) engagement in an activity, (b) spontaneous 
processing of thoughts, and (c) the expression of these thoughts through a medium (e.g., 
voice, a writing tool, a musical instrument).  For example, during jazz pianist Keith 
Jarrett’s (1975) Koln concert, Jarrett was engaged in playing piano, spontaneously 
composing music by channeling a stream of intuitive thoughts, and expressing these 
thoughts through his piano in real time. 
Although I do not wish to deny the validity of any of the previously mentioned 
conceptualizations of creativity, I would like to use a different one in order to achieve 
different ends through the current study: to identify the educationally relevant factors that 
nurture aptitudes for spontaneous creativity.  This shift in conceptualization minimizes 
social value assignment (i.e., labeling) in the definition of creativity and endorses a 
change in the linguistics of the words being and creative.  In the cognitive ability and 
product orientations, the word creative is an adjective assigned to an individual or 
product by external sources (i.e., an assessment measure or an adjudicator) whereby an 
individual or product is described (i.e., labeled) as creative or said to “be creative”.  
Conversely, in my proposed state-based orientation being is used as a verb and creative 
as an adverb describing the way a person is being during a particular interval in time.  In 
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this sense, when a person is engaged in a creative activity that person is being creative, as 
long as the above-mentioned parameters are involved.  Based on the above explanation, it 
can be stated that during the duration (i.e., time interval) of the Koln concert, Keith 
Jarrett was being creative. 
There are congruencies between Csikszentmihalyi’s (1999) concept of flow and 
my own experiential concept of creativity.  For example, both Csikszentmihalyi and I 
refer to creativity as a distinct mental state.  Also, there is evidence of distinct patterns of 
neural activity occurring in frontal brain regions during both these states (Bengtsson, 
Csikszentmihalyi, & Ullen, 2007; Dietrich, 2004b).  However, there are notable 
differences between our concepts.  First, for Csikszentmihalyi, creativity is a value 
assigned to a product or person by domain experts, whereas for me, it is a mental state 
that is separate from the quality of the product being created.  Next, Csikszentmihalyi 
contends that any task can lead to the flow brain state, whereas I argue that tasks relying 
heavily on logical reasoning and critical analysis are associated with a different mental 
state (i.e., a deliberate processing mode). 
Csikszentmihalyi (1999) and I also define flow differently.  For Csikszentmihalyi, 
flow is the sensation of effortlessness, ease, and focus that can occur when people are 
engaged in a task, whereas for me, flow is the stream of intuitive thoughts and ideas that 
emerge spontaneously during engagement in a task.  Fundamentally, for 
Csikszentmihalyi flow is sensation, whereas for me flow is unhindered intuitive cognitive 
ideation occurring in real time.  Our fingers may be pointed towards the same 
psychological phenomenon, however there are differences in the nuances of our 
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conceptualizations of this state.  I therefore do not approach this study as an investigation 
of flow. 
In the coming sections I will review research on the neural correlates of creativity, 
and on the cognitive processes underlying creativity. 
Hierarchy of Consciousness 
Dietrich (2003) conceptualized the brain as being hierarchically ordered. In this 
conceptualization, different brain areas have different functions, with some being more 
basic, simple, and fundamental, and others being more complex.  From an evolutionary 
perspective, the brain can be viewed as having been formed from the inside out.  It is 
hypothesized that the innermost structures dealing with unconscious functions 
fundamental to survival are the oldest and that the outer structures dealing with conscious 
functions such as thinking, planning, sensing, and acting, have evolved more recently 
(Passer, Smith, Atkinson, Mitchell, & Muir, 2003).  Over time, random genetic mutations 
gave rise to areas of the brain that increased the probability of survival and thriving.  
These mutations were passed on becoming part of the species’ regular neuroanatomical 
structure (Passer et al., 2003). 
Anatomy of the brain and the prefrontal cortex. The human brain can be 
deconstructed into three main areas: the forebrain, the midbrain, and the hindbrain.  The 
hind and midbrain, including structures such as the cerebellum, pons, and medulla 
oblongata (as well as a variety of key bundles of neurons called nuclei), are key in 
unconscious automatic functions related to survival (Carlson, 2007). 
When conceptualizing a neuroanatomical hierarchy of consciousness, the 
anatomically lower (and more medial) brain areas (e.g., brainstem) are placed lower in 
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the hierarchy, whereas the increasingly integrative and complex functioning regions 
reside further from the core of the brain, in the higher and more lateral regions (e.g., 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex). The more complex of these regions are located in the 
cerebral cortex, with the prefrontal cortex being the pinnacle higher-order region 
(Dietrich, 2003). 
The lower brain areas will not be discussed further in this dissertation because the 
higher and more frontal areas have been implicated as being associated with divergent 
thinking and with spontaneous artistic composition (Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2005; Fink, 
Graif, & Neubauer, 2009; Limb & Braun, 2008).  I will instead focus on the forebrain, 
and particularly on the prefrontal cortex.  
Anterior to the motor association cortex lies the prefrontal cortex.  Comprising 
nearly half of the frontal lobe, the prefrontal cortex is involved in integrating perceptual 
information, formulating plans and strategies, and instructing the motor cortices to 
execute actions (Dietrich, 2003).  The sum of the processes occurring in the prefrontal 
cortex is often referred to as executive functioning (Dietrich, 2003). 
The prefrontal cortex is functionally divided into two regions: the ventromedial 
and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices.  The ventromedial prefrontal cortex has been 
associated with social functioning and sense of self. Due to its complex interconnections 
with the limbic cortex, Damasio (1994) theorized that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
is involved in emotion related learning; he more incisively theorized that the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex is involved specifically in the assessment of personal 
consequences to one's own behaviours.  Dietrich (2004a) explained that the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex is involved in the manifestation of emotions into consciousness through 
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the delivery of emotional information from deep limbic structures into working memory.  
Alternatively, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex primarily receives innervation from other 
regions of the cerebral cortex (i.e., temporal, occipital, parietal lobes) and its primary 
output is towards the motor cortices.  As such it is not related to emotion-based learning 
as is the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, but rather is involved in cognitive functions such 
as working memory, directed attention, and temporal integration (Fuster, 2000; Goldman-
Rakic, 1992; Knight & Grabowecky, 1999; Posner, 1994).  Dietrich (2004a) explained 
that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is involved in information processing whereby 
thoughts emanating from the temporal, occipital, and parietal lobes are rendered into 
conscious awareness in working memory.  The functions of the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex have been implicated in higher order cognitive abilities such as abstract thinking, 
self-reflective consciousness, and cognitive flexibility.  A number of cognitive neuro-
scientific theorists (Baddeley, 2000; Courtney, Petit, Haxby, & Ungerleider, 1998; 
Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Posner, 1994) have thus interpreted that the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex is the site of “full fledged, self-reflective consciousness” (Dietrich, 
2003, p. 233). 
 Deliberate and spontaneous processing modes and the prefrontal cortex.  
Working memory has been conceptualized as the site of consciousness (Courtney et al., 
1998; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Dietrich, 2004a), however the manner in which 
information manifests into working memory differs as a function of the cognitive 
processing mode a person is in.  Dietrich (2004a) delineated between two different 
processing modes occurring during cognitive ideation—a deliberate mode and a 
spontaneous mode.  The deliberate mode can be compared to what has in past literature 
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been referred to as analytical processing, whereas the spontaneous mode can be 
compared to what has been referred to as intuitive processing (Shirley & Langan-Fox, 
1996; Simonton, 1975).  Instigated by circuits in the prefrontal cortex, deliberate 
processing tends to yield thoughts that are rational, structured, and conforming to 
internalized social norms, whereas spontaneous processing tends to yield an intuitive 
stream of unfiltered, non-conforming thoughts manifested into working memory.  In the 
deliberate processing mode, attention guides the retrieval of information (i.e., semantic 
memories) stored in long-term memory, whereas in the spontaneous processing mode 
attention is less active, allowing for intuitive thoughts to surface into conscious 
awareness.  In deliberate processing, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is recruited in a 
search engine-like process, actively retrieving specific information and rendering it in 
working memory for a transient duration (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; Hasegawa, Hayashi, 
& Miyashita, 1999). The prefrontal cortex instigates this information retrieval process in 
a circuit wherein cognitive information is retrieved from the temporal, occipital, and 
parietal lobes (Friedman & Förster, 2002).  Conversely, in spontaneous processing the 
attention system does not actively select the content of working memory but rather it 
down-regulates.  This allows for unguided thoughts to enter the working memory buffer 
as an intuitive stream of ideas.  In other words, during spontaneous processing, when the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is down-regulated, unpremeditated ideas surface into 
working memory from the temporal, occipital, and parietal lobes (Dietrich, 2003).  As 
such, the quality of content rendered in working memory differs depending on whether 
semantic information is retrieved by deliberate processing or whether intuitive thoughts 
are allowed to emerge into consciousness via spontaneous processing.   
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The prefrontal cortex has also been implicated in the function of inhibitory control 
of inappropriate behaviours.  Lhermitte (1983) and Lhermitte, Pilon, and Serdaru (1986) 
found that frontal lobe patients were overly dependent on immediate environmental cues.  
They lacked the ability to filter environmental triggers and to decide which ones were 
appropriate to imitate or to act upon.  The researchers interpreted that the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex is implicated in the filtering of environmental information, and in 
censoring responses that may be inappropriate or maladaptive. This may be especially 
relevant to creativity because during spontaneous composition it is important for artists to 
be able to bypass internal censoring and to express their intuitive stream of thoughts (i.e., 
internal voice; Dietrich, 2004a). 
The spontaneous processing mode can therefore be conceptualized as a distinct 
mental state characterized by the manifestation of intuitive thoughts in working memory 
and occurring when the frontal attentional network is disengaged from controlling the 
content of the working memory buffer. 
Electroencephalography 
 In 1929, Hans Berger discovered EEG when he measured alpha-band activity over 
the human scalp (Sanei & Chambers, 2007).  Since then, the scope and abilities of EEG 
have been broadened to include the study of different spectral ranges as well as 
synchrony of cortical and subcortical oscillations occurring at different sites over the 
scalp.  Even with the invention of other more spatially accurate imaging technologies 
(e.g., fMRI), EEG has retained its usefulness due to its precise temporal accuracy. 
The underlying assumption of EEG imaging for cognitive neuroscientific study is 
that variation in activity in a specific brain region is an indication of task-relevant 
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recruitment of that specific region (Pfurtscheller & Aranibar, 1977).  Post-synaptic 
potentials in grey matter of the cerebral cortex vary continuously, and it is this variable 
activity that is recorded at various sites across the scalp by EEG, and then described as 
amplitude or power values in spectral frequency ranges (i.e., alpha, beta, delta, theta; 
Rippon, 2006). 
 Most commonly, EEGs are described in terms of frequency.  Spectral analysis is 
used to identify brain-wave characteristics (i.e., amplitude) by frequency range.  These 
ranges have traditionally been labeled as delta waves (less than 4 Hz), theta waves (4-7 
Hz), alpha waves (8-13 Hz), beta waves (14-30 Hz), and gamma waves (30-50 Hz).  
More recently, frequency ranges have been delineated further with alpha frequencies 
divided into low alpha (8-10 Hz) and high alpha (11-13 Hz), and beta frequencies into 
beta 1 (13-16 Hz), beta 2 (16-20 Hz), and beta 3 (20-30 Hz). The alpha and beta ranges 
are most commonly associated with conscious wakeful activity, with alpha activity 
associated with relaxed states (i.e., altered states of consciousness, intuitive states), and 
beta activity associated with logical reasoning (i.e., rational thought, critical analysis; 
Carlson, 2007).   
In the current study, I used EEG to determine if brain-wave changes occurred 
during spontaneous music composition tasks in comparison to less creatively demanding 
tasks.  Further information on the procedure I used is provided in the method section of 
this dissertation. 
Alpha Activity during Creative Cognition 
Alpha activity during divergent thinking.  The quality of thoughts elicited from 
the spontaneous and deliberate processing modes differ, with the deliberate mode 
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yielding more rational and logical thoughts, and the spontaneous mode yielding more 
intuitive ones.  To study these modes empirically, researchers (e.g., Fink, Benedek, 
Grabner, Staudt, & Neubauer, 2007; Jauk, Benedek, & Neubauer, 2012; Jausovec, 1997; 
Krug, MÃėlle, Dodt, Fehm, & Born, 2003) have contrasted tasks involving divergent and 
convergent thinking. 
Divergent thinking tasks involve open-ended questions and stimuli that have 
many possible answers, whereas convergent thinking tasks involve questions and stimuli 
that have only a single correct response.  An example of a divergent thinking task would 
involve asking participants to come up with possible roles that a Canadian prime minister 
can fulfill in a day, whereas an example of a convergent thinking task would be to ask the 
name of the 15th Canadian prime minister.  There are many acceptable responses to the 
divergent thinking question, but only one correct response to the convergent thinking 
question.  Divergent thinking tasks offer a greater opportunity for spontaneous processing 
and for creativity whereas divergent thinking tasks offer a greater opportunity for 
deliberate processing.  Therefore divergent thinking tasks have also been called tasks of 
creative ideation (Fink & Benedek, 2013). 
Those that score highly on tests of divergent thinking have been labeled as having 
a creative cognitive style (Guilford, 1950; see also Eysenck, 1993).  Although divergent 
thinking tests show a high degree of convergent validity (Barron, 1968) and correlate to 
other measures of creativity (Barron & Harrington, 1981), their content validity has been 
challenged (Brown, 1989; Cattell, 1971; Wallach, 1971).  As such, Hochevar and 
Bachelor (1989) recommended using divergent thinking tests to measure subcomponents 
of creativity, and not to measure creativity as a unified construct.  Therefore divergent 
17 
 
thinking tests may be best used to determine divergent thinking ability or originality 
(Penke, 2003). 
A number of researchers have measured alpha activity in the brain during 
divergent and convergent thinking tasks and found increased alpha during divergent 
thinking (Fink et al., 2007; Jauk et al., 2012; Jausovec, 1997; Krug et al., 2003).  For 
example, in a study involving ill-defined (i.e., divergent) versus well-defined (i.e., 
convergent) problem solving tasks, Jausovec (1997) observed increased alpha activity 
in posterior brain regions when participants solved ill-defined problems but not when 
they solved well-defined ones.  Also, in an EEG study on divergent versus convergent 
thinking, Krug et al. (2003) found greater alpha power during divergent thinking tasks 
compared to during convergent thinking tasks.  Along the same lines, Fink et al. (2007) 
found strong frontal alpha synchronization during creative ideation tasks.  In that study a 
number of creative ideation tasks elicited strong frontal alpha synchronization in the 
upper alpha band, whereas a more intelligence-related task elicited substantially less 
alpha synchronization. Fink et al. (2007) interpreted their findings to show that the degree 
of creativity inherent in a task correlates with alpha synchronization occurring in frontal 
brain regions.  In accord with this interpretation, Jauk et al. (2012) found that divergent 
thinking tasks were accompanied by frontal alpha synchronization whereas convergent 
thinking tasks were accompanied by frontal alpha desynchronization.   
Taken together, the above findings indicate that task-related alpha activity is 
related to type of creative thinking (i.e., convergent or divergent thinking) with divergent 
thinking eliciting increased alpha-band activity (Fink & Benadek, 2013). 
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 Alpha activity and originality of ideas.  Researchers have rarely investigated 
differences in brain activity occurring during the production of more or less original 
ideas.  Grabner, Fink, and Neubauer (2007) found that the production of more original 
ideas elicited a different pattern of cortical activity than did the production of less original 
ideas.  Specifically, they found greater right-hemispheric alpha synchronization during 
the production of more original ideas compared to less original ideas (Grabner et al., 
2007).  Conversely, they found no differences in activity in the left hemisphere related to 
more or less original ideas.   
 Alpha activity and creative aptitude.  A number of researchers have found 
differences in alpha activity related to individual differences in aptitude for creativity 
(i.e., high vs. low creativity; Fink, Grabner, et al., 2009; Fink, Graif, & Neubauer, 2009; 
Fink & Neubauer, 2008; Jausovec, 2000; Razumnikova, 2007).  For example, Jausovec 
(2000) found substantially greater alpha activity across the brain in both lower and upper 
alpha bands during divergent thinking tasks in highly creative people compared to people 
who are of average creativity with creativity here measured based on scores on the 
Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking.  Similarly, Fink and Neubauer (2008), 
found greater alpha activity during divergent thinking tasks in people of high creativity 
than in people of low creativity with creativity based on originality scores on the 
Alternate Uses Test, and Razumnikova (2007) found that increased upper alpha power at 
frontal and parietal sites was related to a person’s creativity as measured by originality 
scores on Mednick’s (1962) Remote Associates Test.  Fink, Grabner, et al. (2009) found 
that creative idea generation was associated with strong frontal alpha activity in the upper 
alpha band and that in participants with greater aptitude for creativity frontal alpha 
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activity was stronger in the right than in the left hemisphere.  Conversely, there were no 
hemispheric differences in alpha activity for participants with less aptitude for creativity 
(i.e., originality).  In a separate study from the same lab, Fink, Graif, & Neubauer (2009) 
found higher upper alpha band activity in a group of professional dancers than in a group 
of novice dancers who were instructed to imagine a spontaneously composed dance.  
Furthermore, they found that this increased alpha activity was evident during the 
imagination of a spontaneously composed dance and not during the imagination of a 
previously learned non-spontaneously composed dance (Fink & Benedek, 2013). 
 Alpha activity and interventions that enhance creativity.  In a pair of studies 
from the same research group, researchers (Fink, Grabner, Benedek, & Neubauer, 2006; 
Fink, Schwab, & Papousek, 2011) have also found that training interventions have an 
effect on alpha synchronization during creative ideation.  For example, Fink et al. 
(2006) observed greater originality of ideas and stronger frontal alpha activity in a group 
of participants trained for two weeks on divergent thinking compared to a group that 
didn’t receive training.  Also, Fink et al. (2011) investigated alpha activity in response to 
very brief creativity-related interventions such as being exposed to other people’s 
creative ideas and being presented with the sounds of other people’s laughter.  
They found that those that received training showed increased frontal alpha activity in the 
right hemisphere during creative ideation tasks.   
 Summary of alpha during creative cognition.  In summary, the above-mentioned 
studies have shown that creative ideation is accompanied by increased alpha activity, 
particularly over frontal cortical sites (Fink et al., 2007; Jauk et al., 2012; Jausovec, 1997; 
Krug et al., 2003). Also, research has shown that increased alpha activity is related to an 
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individual’s aptitude for creativity (i.e., high vs low creativity; Fink & Neubauer, 2006; 
Grabner et al., 2007), and that creativity training interventions lead to increased alpha 
activity during subsequent divergent thinking testing (Fink et al., 2006; Fink et al., 
2011).  
Interpretations of Alpha Activity During Creative Cognition 
 Increased alpha activity as cortical idling.  Initially, increased frontal alpha 
activity during creative ideation was assumed to signify reduced cortical 
activity characterized by the transient suppression of executive functions and logical-
rational thought processes (Dietrich, 2003; Fink & Neubauer, 2006).  This phenomenon 
was theorized as cortical idling (Pfurtscheller, 1999; Pfurtscheller, Stancak, & Neuper, 
1996). However, more recent research has shown that increased frontal alpha activity 
may be indicative of sensory inhibition, internal focus of attention, and top down 
processing (Buzsáki & Draguhn, 2004; Klimesch et al., 2007; Ward, 2003). 
 Increased alpha activity as internal processing.  As mentioned above, research 
has shown that increased alpha band activity may be related to top-down processing, 
sensory inhibition, and internal processing demands (Cooper, Croft, Dominey, Burgess, 
& Gruzelier, 2003; Sauseng et al., 2005).  Sauseng et al. (2005) reported frontal alpha 
activity during working memory processing.  They interpreted that during tasks involving 
working memory, a mechanism comes into effect preventing interference from 
distracting new stimuli from the external environment (Sauseng et al., 2005).  Along the 
same lines, Cooper et al. (2003) found greater alpha activity during tasks involving 
internally directed attention in comparison to tasks involving externally directed 
attention.   
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Frontal alpha activity during creative cognition could therefore signify a mental 
state characterized by high internal processing demands and internally oriented attention 
(Knyazev, 2007).  This claim is in accord with studies showing decreased alpha activity 
during external processing tasks as compared to during internal processing tasks (Cooper, 
Burgess, Croft, & Gruzelier, 2006; Cooper et al., 2003; Ray & Cole, 1985) and with 
studies suggesting that increased alpha reflects the inhibition of stimulus-driven, 
externally directed bottom-up processing (Von Stein & Sarnthein, 2000). 
More recently, researchers have begun to investigate the role of internal 
processing mechanisms as they relate to creative ideation (Benedek, Bergner, Könen, 
Fink, & Neubauer, 2011; Fink, Grabner, et al., 2009.  For example, Fink, Grabner, et al. 
(2009) used both EEG and fMRI to investigate the role of internal processing 
mechanisms as they relate specifically to creative ideation.  In the EEG component of the 
study they found frontal alpha synchronization during creative cognition tasks, and 
during the fMRI component they found an increased BOLD response in frontal brain 
regions (Fink et al., 2009a).  Fink and Benadek (2013) interpreted these findings 
to strongly suggest “that alpha synchronization during creative ideation reflects an active 
cognitive process rather than cortical idling” (p. 7). 
Probing more directly, Benedek et al. (2011) compared alpha activity during 
divergent and convergent thinking tasks while controlling for top-down and bottom-up 
processing.  They found increased frontal alpha activity only during tasks with high 
internal processing demands (i.e., top-down processing) compared to tasks involving 
externally focused attention (i.e., bottom-up processing), however they notably found 
increased alpha activity during both convergent and divergent thinking tasks (Benedek et 
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al., 2011).  Benedek et al. interpreted that increased frontal alpha activity reflects a state 
of high internal processing demands regardless of whether a task involves divergent or 
convergent thinking.  These findings soundly refute the cortical idling hypothesis and 
raise questions regarding whether alpha synchronization is related to creativity 
specifically.  However, I interpret these findings as revealing shortcomings in the 
conceptualizations of creativity used in past studies in the domain.  Benedek et al.’s 
findings reveal a need for researchers to conduct investigations on creative cognition 
measuring alpha synchronization as a function of a mental state characterized by internal 
processing and top-down inhibition of external stimuli (i.e., studies on artistic 
improvisation and spontaneous composition).  
 Summary of interpretations of alpha.  In summary, the collective EEG findings 
showing increased frontal alpha activity occurring during creative cognition are quite 
consistent.  These findings show that increased alpha activity during creative cognition 
most likely signifies the occurrence of a distinct processing mode occurring during 
spontaneous creativity that is characterized by internally oriented attention, suspension of 
external bottom-up stimulation, and top-down processing. 
Heritability of Creativity 
Behavioural genetics studies on creativity have mostly focused on tests of 
divergent thinking, with all such studies on creativity having been twin studies (Penke, 
2003).  Studies on twins using the behavioural genetic method show the degree to which 
traits are explained by heritability (i.e., genetics), shared environmental influences, and 
non-shared environmental influences, with different traits showing different percentages 
of each of these determinants.  In the behavioural genetic method monozygotic and 
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dizygotic twins are compared on behavioural measures.  Underlying this method is the 
rationale that monozygotic (i.e., identical) twins share 100% of their genome, while 
dizygotic (i.e., fraternal) twins share only 50% on average (Penke, 2003).   
In a review of ten twin studies on divergent thinking, Nichols (1978) reported that 
variance in ideational fluency was explained by 22% genetic influences, 39% shared 
environmental influences, and 39% non-shared environmental influences.  Reznikoff, 
Domino, Bridges, and Honeyman (1973) administered ten creative ability tests to a 
sample of monozygotic and dizygotic adolescent twin pairs and found that scores on five 
Guilford tests (including the Alternate Uses Test) were explained by 25% genetic 
influences, 38% shared environmental influences, and 37% non-shared environmental 
and error variance. In a study of monozygotic and dizygotic Russian adolescent twin 
pairs, Grigorenko, LaBude, and Carter (1992) found that scores on the verbal component 
of the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking were explained by an estimated 44% genetic 
influences, 42% shared environmental influences, and 14% non-shared environmental 
and error variance influences. 
In total, the heritability of originality as measured by performance on tests of 
divergent thinking appears to be moderate.  In his review of the literature, Penke (2003) 
added results from Reznikoff et al. (1973) and the Grigorenko et al. (1992) studies to 
those summarized by Nichols (1978) and found a total of roughly 25% genetic, 38% 
shared environmental, and 37% non-shared environmental and error influences 
determining scores on divergent thinking tests.  According to these percentages, 
heritability for divergent thinking tests appear to be lower than for personality traits in 
general, and substantially lower than for cognitive abilities, whereas shared 
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environmental influences appear to be strong in relation to the norm for a cognitive 
ability (Plomin, DeFries, McClearn, & Rutter, 1997).  This suggests that the divergent 
thinking style (i.e., originality) is a cognitive ability or personality dimension determined 
by an interaction between genetics and environment, with environment being a 
substantial influence (Penke, 2003). 
Researchers have also investigated the heritability of creative achievement.  In a 
study of monozygotic and dizygotic pairs separated at birth and reunited in adulthood, 
Waller, Bouchard, Lykken, Tellegen, and Blacker (1993) found that the monozygotic 
twins showed a heritability of .54 whereas the dizygotic twins showed a heritability of -
.06.  Considering these findings and the opposing evidence of low to moderate 
heritability of divergent thinking, Waller et al. concluded that creativity is an emergenic 
phenomenon. 
Creativity as an Emergenic Phenomenon 
Emergenesis (Lykken, 1982; Lykken, McGue, Tellegen, & Bouchard, 1992) is a 
theory describing the heritability of complex higher-order traits as determined by an 
interaction of multiple, fundamental, partly heritable and partly environmentally 
attributable traits. 
In a meta-analysis of 26 studies on the personality traits of creative people, Feist 
(1998) concluded that “Creative people are more autonomous, introverted, open to new 
experiences, norm-doubting, self-confident, self-accepting, driven, ambitious, dominant, 
hostile, and impulsive” (p. 299).  Specifically, he found the largest relationships of 
creativity with openness to experiences, conscientiousness, self-acceptance, hostility, and 
impulsivity.  Feist also reviewed longitudinal studies on the chronological order of 
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personality and creativity and found no evidence that creative achievement determined 
subsequent personality traits.  In sum, longitudinal studies suggest that the personality 
characteristics of creative people remain stable over time (Feist, 1998; Feist & Barron, 
2003) This suggests that creative personality characteristics predict creative achievement, 
but that creative achievement does not predict creative personality characteristics (Penke, 
2003). 
In a comprehensive study comparing divergent thinking and personality, McCrae 
(1987) used five of Guilford’s divergent thinking tests, as well as Gough’s (1979) 
Creative Personality Scale and found that Openness to Experience was the only 
personality measure that was significantly correlated with divergent thinking.  While 
McCrae’s (1987) findings were replicated by Rawlings, Twomey, Burns, and Morris 
(1998), other findings have implicated Psychoticism as a trait more related to divergent 
thinking and originality than Openness to Experience (Rawlings, 1985; Stayte, 1977; 
Wallach & Kogan, 1965).   
Overall, although a number of traits have been variably identified as correlating 
and not correlating with creativity, studies on the personality traits of creative people 
suggest Openness to Experience as a trait of more original people as measured by tests of 
divergent thinking. 
Research on the heritability of personality indicates that a number of traits 
underlie the creative personality style.  Eysenck (1993, 1995a, 1995b) theorized that the 
genetic underpinnings of a disposition towards creativity are the same as those underlying 
Psychoticism.  However, in a series of later studies Peterson, Smith, and Carson (2002) 
and Peterson and Carson (2000) found a substantially larger association of the cognitive 
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processes underlying divergent thinking with Openness to Experience and Extraversion 
than with Psychoticism.  These results suggest that the genetic underpinnings of a 
disposition towards originality are the same as those underlying Openness to Experience 
and Extraversion.  These determinants have been shown to have moderate to substantial 
heritabilities (Heath, Eaves, & Martin, 1989; Plomin et al., 1997), and as they have been 
related to creativity (Goldberg, 1994; Johnson, 1994; Ostendorf & Angleitner, 1994) it 
can be summarized that heritable personality traits play at least a moderate and possibly a 
substantial role in the phenotypic expression of creativity as a trait (Penke, 2003). 
In a study taking an emergenic approach, Penke (2003) investigated differences in 
creativity, as measured by elaboration and originality scores on an image completion 
task, between monozygotic and dizygotic twins while controlling for intelligence and 
personality factors.  He found creativity to be explained by 60% genetics and less than 
40% non-shared environmental influences and error variance.  He found a combination of 
traits including Openness to Experience, General Intelligence, Extraversion, and low 
Conscientiousness as synergistically combining to determine creativity.  In support of this 
notion, Openness to Experience has been found to be related to divergent thinking as 
measured by ideational fluency (Hocevar, 1979a, 1979c).  Also, Openness to Experience 
is a trait that has been further deconstructed into component characteristics including 
intellectual curiosity, active imagination, unconventional attitudes, and preference for 
novelties and independence in opinion-formation (Angleitner & Ostendorf, 2003; 
McCrae, 1994), all of which support and are related to divergent thinking (Penke, 2003). 
Therefore it can be summarized that although evidence shows only moderate 
heritability of a divergent thinking (i.e., original) personality style, from an emergenic 
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perspective a substantial amount of creativity as a whole is determined by interactions of 
heritable traits, with a number of necessary but not sufficient traits comprising to deliver 
the phenotypic expression of the cognitive ability of creativity (Asendorpf, 1999). From 
this perspective, a large amount of creativity may be explained by genetics, and 
Creativity may be conceptualized as a personality trait, consisting of a divergent thinking 
aptitude that can be called Originality. 
Gagné’s Theory of Talent Development  
In his differentiated model of giftedness and talent, Gagné (2005) discerned 
between gifts and talents, defining gifts as natural abilities or aptitudes and talents as 
systematically developed skills.  In this model, Gagné (2005) provided a conceptual 
framework to explain how aptitudes develop into systematically developed skills by 
proposing four categories of factors influencing such development.  These include 
interpersonal catalysts, environmental catalysts, learning and practice, and chance.  He 
suggested that aptitudes develop into skills through informal and formal learning and 
practicing, and that interpersonal catalysts, environmental catalysts, and chance act as 
facilitators or inhibitors of such development (Gagné, 2005). 
Gifts.  Aptitudes have been categorized in numerous ways.  For example, Carroll 
(1993) described a three-level hierarchy of abilities, Gardner (1983) described a theory of 
multiple intelligences, and Sternberg (1985) described a triarchic theory of intelligences.  
In his differentiated model of giftedness and talent, Gagné (2005) proposed four aptitude 
domains including intellectual, creative, socioaffective, and sensorimotor aptitudes.  
Amongst creative aptitudes he included problem-solving ability, imagination, and 
originality.  Although developed in the context of giftedness, Gagné (2005) argued 
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“natural abilities manifest themselves in all children to a variable degree” (p. 62).  As 
shown in the above section on the heritability of creativity as an emergenic personality 
dimension, there is considerable evidence supporting the claim that aptitudes (i.e., 
originality) are stable, and are explained by an interaction of genetics and environmental 
influences. 
Talents.  According to Gagné (1997), talents (i.e., systematically developed 
skills) emerge through the development of aptitudes into trained skills in a particular 
domain.  Gagné (1997) pointed out that aptitudes variably develop into competencies 
ranging from what is minimally acceptable in a domain to what is above average 
compared to the norm, with the label of talented characterizing expertise and 
achievement in the top 10% of a population in a domain.  Although he conceptualized 
talent as achievement in the top 10% on a given skill relative to the normal population, 
the notion of talent as developed from aptitude applies to all levels of natural ability (i.e., 
average, low, high; Gagné, 1997).  Aptitudes manifest in different ways and with varying 
degree depending on the context in which they are applied.  For example, a sensitive 
palette and a finely attuned olfactory sense may predispose an individual towards high 
talent as a chef.  As related to the current study, an aptitude of high originality may 
predispose an individual towards high skill as a musical improviser. 
Learning and practice.  According to Gagné (2005) aptitudes develop into skills 
through learning and practice.  In Gagné’s (2005) model, there are four forms of aptitude 
development: (a) maturation, (b) informal learning, (c) formal non-institutional learning, 
and (d) formal institutional learning.  Maturation accounts for development determined 
directly by genetics.  For example, genetic coding dictates the development of and 
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growth of human skeletal structures.  Informal learning refers to semantic (i.e., facts) and 
procedural (i.e., skills) knowledge gained through unstructured and not consciously 
directed everyday activities and interactions.  For example, social skills are learned by 
children through everyday interactions with parents, siblings, and peers in non-
institutional environments during activities and interactions wherein learning is not 
intentionally structured or planned (Bandura, 1977; Bronfenbrenner, 1989). 
The final two forms of aptitude development are formal non-institutional learning, 
and formal institutional learning.  For both of these, the term formal refers to the presence 
of purposeful by-design manners of systematically obtaining learning outcomes.  By 
Gagné’s (2005) definition, formal non-institutional learning refers to structured and 
planned autodidactic (i.e., self-taught) learning, whereas formal institutional learning 
refers to structured and planned learning that is institutionally based (e.g., going to 
school, enrolling in a music conservatory, attending sports camp). 
Gagné (2005) noted that each of these forms contributes to the development of 
aptitudes in inverse proportion to its formality, whereas the opposite is true for 
systematically developed skills.  This means that maturation factors (i.e., genetics) play 
the greatest role in the development of gifts, whereas formal institutional learning plays 
the smallest role.  Conversely, formal institutional learning has the greatest effect on the 
development of talents (i.e., highly specialized skills), whereas maturation has the least 
effect. 
Artists’ Experience of Creativity 
 As outlined earlier in this dissertation, I conceptualize creativity as a distinct mental 
state characterized by spontaneous intuitive thoughts expressed through a medium (i.e., 
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musical instrument, drawing tool) in real time.  Several researchers (Berkowitz, 2007; 
Berliner, 1994; Nardone, 1997; Nelson & Rawlings, 2007) have asked improvising artists 
to describe their experiences during spontaneous composition (i.e., improvisation), and a 
number of common themes have emerged.  Among these are the perceptions of (a) 
dissolution of self and of time, (b) operating from an intuitive mental state, and (c) 
moving between intuitive and analytic mental states (Nelson & Rawlings, 2007). 
Dissolution of self.  Creative individuals have described alternating between 
heightened and diminished senses of self during the creative process.  In an interview 
with Aaron Berkowitz (2010), Malcom Bilson described witnessing his voice during 
improvisation as arising without the sense of a conscious self making artistic choices.  
Witnessing voice is a common description of improvisers’ experience wherein they report 
feeling as though they are conduits for self-expression, whether it is spoken, written, or 
musical.  Along the same lines, Nardone (1997) described improvisation as a 
dichotomous state wherein the artist experiences “yielding,” and “being present, and not 
present” (pp. 127-128). 
Nelson and Rawlings (2007) reported artists’ descriptions of the creative process.  
Artists described the feeling of being a witness to a deeper intuitive artistic voice or 
vision.  These artists also described diminished feelings of self and of personal control 
over the creative process. Nelson and Rawlings (2007) interpreted this perception of loss 
of control to be a function of the temporary suspension of analytical and critical cognitive 
processes.  Since these processes function during everyday life, artists may associate 
these with their sense of self and when suspended, they experience a foreign feeling that 
they interpret as a loss of self.  In the same study, participants described themselves as the 
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“receiver” of ideas: again echoing the sense of being a sort of conduit for intuition 
(Nelson & Rawlings, 2007). 
Intuitive mental state.  Improvisers from varied musical traditions have reported 
their experiences of the creative process as a yielding to the subconscious, and also as a 
suspension of conscious (rational) control during the creative process (Berkowitz, 2010).  
Nelson and Rawlings (2007) described the intuitive mental state as “unmediated 
expression of the artist's emotions and flow of ideas while involved in the artistic 
activity” (p. 231).  
American pianist and composer Robert Levin recounted a sense of being a 
witness to the subconscious during improvisation: a sense of not being in control, but 
rather of giving way to the subconscious voice (Berkowitz, 2010).  Levin continued to 
describe improvisation as being analogous to the feeling of “going down the bobsled” 
(Berkowitz, 2010, p. 125).  This can be interpreted to mean that when improvising one is 
following momentum not one’s own.  It feels as though one is the guider of a vehicle 
controlled by forces other than one’s self.  Along the same lines, Nardone (1997) 
envisioned the improvisatory experience as a divided one, where the improviser has a 
sense of self split into two: creator and witness.  Nardone implied an unconscious voicing 
self and an onlooker who watches and relaxes critical and rational mental processes.  
Rather than relying on analysis or criticism, the creative individual relies on intuition and 
on an internal sense of what feels right.  Another way of framing this is that in the 
creative space the individual suspends rationality and analytical thinking, and enters into 
an intuitive mental state.  
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 Fluctuation between intuitive and analytic mental states.  Nelson and 
Rawlings (2007) reported that artists experienced an alternating or “moving” between 
intuitive and analytic modes of engagement when immersed in creative activity.  In the 
intuitive mode, artists felt a sense of deep connection (or melding) with the work, 
whereas in the analytic mode they felt a sense of distance from it.  As described above, 
when in the intuitive mode, artists were process oriented: deeply absorbed in the work 
and with an intuition-based sense of what direction or choice to make “in the moment.”  
In the analytic mode, they were product oriented: concerned with external factors such as 
audience reactions and rules of the domain/craft.  Artists reported regaining self-
awareness (i.e., awareness of their physical bodies and of the passing of time) when they 
withdrew from the intuitive mode (Nelson & Rawlings, 2007).  These reports are in 
accord with Dietrich’s (2004a) processing modes, outlined in the sections above, with the 
analytic mode being analogous to deliberate processing and the intuitive mode being 
analogous to spontaneous processing. 
Therefore, it can be summarized that the experiences of improvising artists appear 
to be commensurate with cognitive and neurocognitive evidence supporting the notion of 
a spontaneous processing mode occurring during creative cognition. 
Studies of Artistic Creativity 
Relatively few studies have used neuroscientific measures to investigate creativity 
in artistic domains (e.g., music, painting, dancing).  In a review of the literature, Dietrich 
and Kanso (2010) found seven EEG studies, all of which emanated from three research 
groups; five fMRI studies; and one PET study.  A common characteristic across these 
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studies was an emphasis on the ecological validity (i.e., authenticity) of the tasks 
involved (Dietrich & Kanso, 2010). 
EEG studies.  In studies involving the mental imagery of artistic tasks, 
Bhattacharya and Petsche (2002, 2005) and Petsche et al. (1997) found frontal alpha 
desynchronization, whereas in a study involving the mental imagery of the spontaneous 
composition of a free-form dance, Fink, Graif, and Neubauer (2009) found alpha 
synchronization.  Fink, Graif, and Neubauer’s (2009) results did not fit the trend of the 
previous findings, however it can be argued that their task had greater ecological validity, 
and that tasks involving visual arts recruit frontal brain regions for different or additional 
processes compared to non-visual arts (Dietrich & Kanso, 2010). 
In total, the EEG studies did not elicit conclusive evidence regarding hemispheric 
specialization during artistic creativity.  However, several of the studies showed 
increased alpha power in the right hemisphere (Fink, Graif, & Neubauer, 2009; 
Martindale, Hines, Mitchell, & Covello, 1984), and increased right hemispheric 
synchrony in other frequency bands (Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2002, 2005; Petsche et al., 
1997).  
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging studies.  In five studies using 
neuroimaging methods (i.e., fMRI) to investigate artistic creativity (Bengtsson et al., 
2007; Berkowitz & Ansari, 2008; Brown, Martinez, & Parsons, 2006; Kowatari et al., 
2009; Solso, 2001) researchers reported activation in various areas of the prefrontal 
cortex.  Conversely, Limb and Braun (2008) found deactivation in areas of the prefrontal 
cortex.  As EEG alpha-band activity has been interpreted as an inverse measure of overall 
cortical activity, the deactivation found by Limb and Braun is in accordance with 
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previous findings of increased EEG alpha-band activity during creative cognition.  It can 
be argued that Limb and Braun’s study differed from the other fMRI studies on artistic 
creativity in that it provided the clearest opportunity for participants to engage in 
spontaneous processing without extraneous (i.e., distracting) semantic memory retrieval 
(i.e., deliberate processing).  For example, Berkowitz and Ansari (2008) required 
participants to learn a system wherein musical notes were represented by letters, 
providing an extra step of mental processing.  Conversely, Limb and Braun required 
participants to play melodic phrases on a realistic keyboard potentially permitting less 
distraction and more direct engagement in the spontaneous mode.  In another study 
finding activation during improvisation, Brown et al. (2006) required participants to 
complete unfinished musical phrases.  This may have been a task that failed to provide 
enough time to switch from focusing attention externally (i.e., listening) to focusing 
attention internally (i.e., improvising; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010).  In other words, this task 
may not have provided enough time to switch between deliberate and spontaneous 
processing modes. 
The collected findings indicate that there is not one specific brain area implicated 
in creativity, except for the frontal brain areas that may play a special role.  Also, findings 
indicate “the role of the prefrontal cortex in creative thinking is not of the yea-or-nay 
kind” (Dietrich & Kanso, 2010, p. 838).  Some research has found prefrontal activation 
during artistic creativity whereas other research has found prefrontal deactivation.  To 
explain these opposing findings, Dietrich and Kanso (2010) postulated that, “It may be 
the case that there are different types of creativity, some that depend on prefrontal 
engagement and some that benefit from prefrontal disengagement” (p. 838).  Therefore, 
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when investigating the neural correlates of creativity it is important to delineate different 
types of artistic creativity, different types of creativity tasks, and the cognitive processes 
and mental states underlying these.  Therefore, research is needed that defines specific 
subareas of creativity and focuses on investigating changes in prefrontal activity during 
tasks that facilitate these subcreativities. 
Assessment of Creativity 
 The assessment of creativity has been a variegated endeavor as researchers have 
attempted to measure the construct using a variety of measures.  These assessments have 
typically aimed to measure creative processes, personality and behavioural correlates of 
creativity, attitudes towards creativity, characteristics of creative products, and 
environmental factors that foster creativity (Plucker & Makel, 2010). 
 Assessments of creative processes.  Assessments of creative process have been 
dominated by tests of divergent thinking (Plucker & Makel, 2010).  Recall that tests of 
divergent thinking pose questions that can be answered in multiple ways, whereas tests of 
convergent thinking pose questions that call for a single correct response.  In assessments 
of divergent thinking (e.g., the Alternate Uses Test), test facilitators typically provide a 
verbal or figural prompt upon which test-takers generate a number of responses.  These 
responses have traditionally been measured as a composite of (a) ideational fluency 
(quantity of responses), (b) originality (divergent from the norm), (c) flexibility 
(production of different types of ideas), and (d) elaboration (extension of ideas through 
details). 
 The Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT; Torrance, 1974) are the most 
commonly used tests of creative process and of divergent thinking.  These tests include 
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verbal (e.g., Asking, Guessing Causes, Product Improvement) and figural (e.g., Picture 
Construction, Picture Completion, Lines/Circles) subtests that are administered and 
scored in a standardized manner and include detailed norms (Plucker & Makel, 2010).  
Although the TTCT have been the most popular tests of divergent thinking, others have 
been used as well including the Alternate Uses Test (Guilford, 1967).  I selected the 
Alternate uses Test as a measure of divergent thinking for the current study and I will 
describe the Alternate Uses Test in detail at the end of the subsection on the assessment 
of creativity when I elaborate on the two assessments of creativity that I chose. 
 Assessment of creative personality and behaviours. Assessments of creative 
personality have typically involved self-report or external ratings to measure the 
personality characteristics of people that have been labeled creative.  Examples of such 
batteries include the Big Five NEO – Five Factor Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and 
specific subtests of the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (Cattell, Eber, & 
Tatsuoka, 1970). 
 Researchers have also assessed creative personality through creative individuals’ 
self-reports of their previous accomplishments and behaviours.  The assumption here is 
that past creativity may best predict future creativity and thus aptitude for creativity.  
Examples of self-report assessments include the Creative Behaviour Inventory (Hocevar, 
1979b), the Alpha Biological Inventory (Taylor & Ellison, 1966), the Creativity 
Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ; Carson, Peterson & Higgins, 2005), and the Runco 
Ideational Behaviour Scale (RIBS; Runco, 2008).  In such measures individuals are 
presented with descriptions of creative achievements or behaviours, and are prompted to 
rate the degree to which these describe their own past experiences. 
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 Assessments of attitudes towards creativity.  Research on attitudes towards 
creativity has shown these are related to creative thinking ability (Basadur & Finkbeiner, 
1985).  Assessments of attitudes towards creativity typically involve the rating of 
agreement or disagreement with statements that reflect a preference or aversion to factors 
associated with creativity.  Although very few exist, examples of assessments of attitudes 
towards creativity include two scales developed by Basadur and colleagues (Basadur & 
Finkbeiner, 1985; Basadur & Hausdorf, 1996; Basadur, Taggar, & Pringle, 1999; 
Basadur, Wakabashi & Graen, 1990; Runco & Basadur, 1993) that measure contrasting 
attitudes towards divergent thinking; the Preference for Active Divergence Scale 
measures an inclination towards divergent thinking, whereas the Preference for 
Premature Convergence Scale measures an aversion to divergence and open-ended 
responding (Plucker & Makel, 2010). 
 Recently, creative self-efficacy has received attention as an important area of 
attitude towards creativity measurement (Plucker & Makel, 2010).  According to Tierney 
and Farmer (2002), creative self-efficacy is a concept representing a person’s cumulative 
beliefs about his or her own creative abilities.  In an example of an assessment of creative 
self-efficacy, Beghetto (2006) created a very brief yet succinct three-item scale wherein 
participants reported the extent of their agreement with positive self-beliefs regarding 
their ideation, novelty, and imagination abilities. 
 Assessment of creative products.  Assessments of creative products may be 
amongst the most pragmatically applicable assessments of creativity (Plucker & Makel, 
2010).  In commercial environments these assessments are used to measure the creativity 
of new innovations and help inform of whether these are expected to yield profits.  
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Additionally, psychologists Runco (1989a) and Baer, Kaufman, and Gentile (2004) agree 
that product assessments may be amongst the most appropriate assessments of creativity.  
Assessments of creative products typically include the rating of artifacts of the creative 
process by the creator or by external adjudicators.  Although several assessment of 
creative products are available, including the Creative Product Semantic Scale (Besemer, 
1998) and the Student Product Assessment Form (Reis & Renzulli, 1991), the most 
commonly used is Amabile’s (1982) Consensual Assessment Technique (Plucker & 
Makel, 2010).  I selected the Consensual Assessment Technique as a method of assessing 
creative products in the current study and I will describe this assessment in further detail 
at the end of the subsection on the assessment of creativity when I elaborate on the two 
assessments of creativity that I chose. 
 Assessments of environment factors that foster creativity.  In their review of 
the literature on environmental influences on creativity, Hunter, Bedell, and Mumford 
(2007) found that creativity was associated with a number of environmental influences 
(e.g., organizational structure, competition).  Typically, in assessments of environmental 
factors associated with creativity researchers question stakeholders (e.g., employers, staff, 
clients) to identify the aspects of the work environment that were present during previous 
creative projects or experiences.  As a popular measure of environmental factors fostering 
creativity, the KEYS: Assessing the Climate for Creativity battery (Amabile, Conti, 
Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996) measures people’s perceptions of aspects of their work 
environments.  Overall, research from the domains of business and management has 
shown that work environments and creativity are related (Plucker & Makel, 2010).   
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 Selected assessments for the current study.  In the coming sections I describe 
and discuss the assessments of creativity that I selected to complement the EEG data in 
the current study. 
 The Alternate Uses Test.  Recall that psychometric assessments of divergent 
thinking traditionally measure creativity as a composite of (a) ideational fluency (quantity 
of responses), (b) originality (divergent from the norm), and (c) flexibility (production of 
different types of ideas).  Amongst studies on the EEG correlates of creative ideation, 
ideational fluency and originality have often been measured using the Alternate Uses Test 
(Fink, Graif, & Neubauer, 2009; Fink & Neubauer, 2008; Martindale & Hines, 1975), an 
assessment wherein participants free-associate different uses for a small number of 
common household items (e.g., newspaper, brick, etc.) within a given time limit.  Several 
cognitive theories of creativity, including primary process cognition, defocussed 
attention, and associative hierarchies, have laid the foundation for the use of the Alternate 
Uses Test for both psychometric and research purposes (Martindale, 1999).  
 Primary process cognition.  Theorists of primary process cognition suggested that 
consciousness operates as a spectrum of primary and secondary process states (Fromm, 
1978).  Primary process states are free-associative and analogical while secondary 
process states are logical and reality-oriented (Martindale, 1999).  Kris (1952) proposed 
that creative individuals have a greater ability to access primary process states, and a 
subsequent lineage of research has supported this proposition.  For example, creative 
individuals have been shown to report more fantasy activity, to have greater ability to 
remember dreams, and to be more easily hypnotized than the average person (Hudson, 
1975; Lynn & Rhue, 1986; Martindale & Dailey, 1996; Wild, 1965). 
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 Defocused attention. Theorists of defocussed attention (Dewing & Battye, 1971; 
Dykes & McGhie, 1976) reported that creative individuals have a greater ability to hold a 
number of mental elements in mind at once than the average person, and that less creative 
individuals tend to focus only on singular elements.  The theory of defocussed attention is 
founded on the assumption that for analogies between mental elements to be made they 
must be held in working memory concurrently (Mendelsohn, 1976). 
 Associative hierarchies.  The theory of associative hierarchies is one that 
examines the quantity of associations an individual can generate when provided with a 
stimulus word (or concept), as well as the relative strength of the connection between 
each of these responses and the original stimulus.  Creative individuals generate a greater 
amount of associative responses, and the strength of these responses are qualitatively 
similar to one another (Mednick, 1962).  Conversely, less creative individuals generate 
fewer associative responses, and the strength of association of their responses diminishes 
with each subsequent response.  The associative hierarchies of creative individuals are 
therefore depicted as being flat, and those of less creative individuals as being steep.   
 As a free-associative measure of an individual’s creative ability, the Alternate 
Uses Test has been used as a divergent thinking measure in several studies investigating 
the neural correlates of creativity (Fink, Graif, & Neubauer, 2009; Martindale & Hines, 
1975).  For example, Martindale and Hines (1975) found increased alpha activity when 
participants engaged in a three-item version of the Alternate Uses Test.  They recorded 
EEGs as participants generated potential uses for a brick, a shoe, and a newspaper.  The 
authors found increased alpha activity and interpreted that it “supports the hypothesis of 
an association between creativity and low cortical activation, specifically during tasks 
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that call for or allow creativity” (Martindale & Hines, 1975, p. 98).  As shown earlier, 
research showing alpha synchronization to be related to top-down processing, has 
brought the notion of alpha activity as reduced cortical activity under considerable 
scrutiny (Klimesch et al., 2007).  However, the theory of associative hierarchies remains 
congruent with the updated interpretation of alpha synchronization as increased activity. 
 The Consensual Assessment Technique.  Developed by Amabile (1982), the 
Consensual Assessment Technique is a loosely bound way of measuring the creativity of 
products based on judgments made by independent raters.  In the Consensual Assessment 
Technique, researchers typically refrain from imposing predetermined definitions of 
creativity on adjudicators, however Amabile (1982) herself defined creativity as novelty 
and appropriateness as agreed upon by suitable adjudicators (i.e., domain experts).  
Amabile (1982) suggested that adjudicators rate independently of one another, and that 
ratings include additional criteria such as technique and aesthetic appeal.  These 
additional criteria provide benchmarks for discriminant validity testing, and broaden the 
definition of creativity to include aspects of performances and products that signify their 
overall value.  Pearson product moment correlations are used to calculate inter-rater 
reliability, with coefficients of 0.70 and higher deemed acceptable.  Here, inter-rater 
reliability is akin to construct validity following Amabile’s (1982) notion that a product is 
deemed creative as much as it is agreed to be so by appropriate observers.  The 
Consensual Assessment Technique has been used extensively as a measure of between-
subjects differences in creativity (Baer et al., 2004; Baer & Oldham, 2006; Hennessey, 
1994; Kaufman, Baer, Cole, & Sexton, 2008), showing it to be a reliable measure with a 
high degree of ecological validity (Hennessey, Amabile, & Mueller, 2010). 
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Summary 
In the following paragraphs I will summarize the most relevant points made in the 
sections above.  I will then outline the aims of my study, my research questions, and my 
hypotheses. 
Creativity has been conceptualized as (a) a cognitive ability, (b) embedded in 
created products, and (c) a value assigned by domain experts.  I conceptualize creativity 
as a distinct mental state, characterized by spontaneous intuitive ideation occurring in real 
time. 
Dietrich (2004a) delineated two different processing modes occurring during 
cognitive ideation - a deliberate mode and a spontaneous mode.  Instigated by circuits in 
the prefrontal cortex, deliberate processing yields thoughts that are rational, structured, 
and conforming to social norms, whereas spontaneous processing yields an intuitive 
stream of unfiltered, non-conforming thoughts.  In deliberate processing, the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex is recruited in an active information retrieval process (Cabeza & 
Nyberg, 2000; Hasegawa et al., 1999) whereas during spontaneous processing the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is down-regulated allowing unpremeditated ideas to surface 
into working memory (Dietrich, 2003). 
Divergent thinking tasks involve open-ended questions with many possible 
answers, whereas convergent thinking tasks involve questions with only a single correct 
response.  Divergent thinking tasks offer a greater opportunity for spontaneous 
processing whereas convergent thinking tasks offer a greater opportunity for deliberate 
processing.  Those that score highly on tests of divergent thinking have been labeled as 
having an aptitude for originality (Eysenck, 1993).   
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EEG findings showing increased frontal alpha activity occurring during creative 
cognition are quite consistent.  Research has shown that divergent thinking is 
accompanied by increased frontal alpha activity (Fink et al., 2007; Jauk et al., 2012; 
Jausovec, 1997; Krug et al., 2003), that increased alpha activity is related to creative 
aptitude (i.e., high vs. low creativity; Fink & Neubauer, 2006; Grabner et al., 2007), and 
that alpha activity increases as a result of creativity training (Fink et al., 2006; Fink et al. 
2011).  Initially, increased alpha was interpreted as cortical idling, however recently it 
has been interpreted as sensory inhibition, internal focus of attention, and top-down 
processing.  Therefore, increased alpha activity during creative cognition suggests 
the occurrence of a distinct processing mode occurring during creative ideation that is 
analogous to the mental state that Dietrich (2004a) called a spontaneous processing 
mode. 
In his differentiated model of gifts and talents, Gagné (2005) provided a 
conceptual framework explaining how aptitudes transform into systematically developed 
skills through informal and formal learning.  Evidence shows moderate heritability of a 
divergent thinking (i.e., originality) aptitude, however, from an emergenic perspective a 
substantial amount of creativity is determined by interactions of heritable traits 
(Asendorpf, 1999). From this perspective, a substantial percentage of creative aptitude is 
explained by genetics.  In Gagné’s (2005) model, there are four forms of aptitude 
development: (a) maturation, (b) informal learning, (c) informal institutional learning, 
and (d) formal institutional learning.  By Gagné’s (2005) definition, formal non-
institutional learning refers to structured and planned autodidactic learning, whereas 
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formal institutional learning refers to structured and planned learning that is 
institutionally based.  
Improvising artists’ descriptions of their experiences during spontaneous 
composition (i.e., improvisation) include perceptions of (a) a dissolution of self and of 
time, (b) operating from an intuitive mental state, and (c) alternating between intuitive 
and analytic mental states.  These experiences are commensurate with cognitive and 
neurocognitive evidence supporting the notion of a spontaneous processing mode 
occurring during creative cognition. 
Few studies have used neuroscientific measures to investigate artistic creativity, 
but Dietrich and Kanso (2010) found seven EEG studies and five fMRI studies 
incorporating authentic artistic tasks.  Several EEG studies found frontal alpha 
desynchronization during artistic creativity tasks, whereas others found alpha 
synchronization.  In four fMRI studies on artistic creativity (Bengtsson et al., 2007; 
Berkowitz & Ansari, 2008; Brown et al., 2006; Kowatari et al., 2009; Solso, 2001) 
researchers reported activation in areas of the prefrontal cortex, whereas in another fMRI 
study Limb and Braun (2008) found deactivation in areas of the prefrontal cortex.  As 
EEG alpha-band activity has been interpreted as an inverse measure of cortical activity, 
the deactivation found by Limb and Braun is in accordance with previous findings of 
increased EEG alpha-band activity during creative cognition.  The collected EEG and 
fMRI findings indicate that there is not one specific brain area implicated in artistic 
creativity, except for the frontal brain area.  Furthermore, EEG studies did not elicit 
conclusive evidence regarding hemispheric specialization during artistic creativity.  
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However, several studies showed increased alpha power in the right hemisphere (Fink, 
Graif, & Neubauer, 2009; Martindale et al., 1984). 
A number of neuroscientific imaging methods have been used to investigate the 
neural correlates of spontaneous artistic composition (Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2005; 
Fink, Graif, & Neubauer, 2009).  Specifically, EEG has been used to investigate alpha 
wave activity in dancers and visual artists, and fMRI has been used in studies of musical 
improvisation (Berkowitz & Ansari, 2008; Limb & Braun, 2008).  To date, there have 
been no studies using EEG to investigate frontal alpha activity during musical 
improvisation.  Because of its high temporal accuracy, EEG is a suitable method for 
investigating creativity as a distinct mental state; however, neuroscientific research on 
improvisation has been dominated by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
which is better suited to answering questions of localization.  When investigating the 
neural correlates of creativity it is important to delineate different types of artistic 
creativity.  Research is needed that defines specific subareas of creativity and that focuses 
on frontal brain activity during these subcreativities.   
Aims, Research Questions, and Hypotheses 
 For the main part of this study I aimed to investigate (a) whether creativity can be 
conceptualized as a distinct mental state, and (b) whether creativity is moderated by 
previous domain specific education.  For the purpose of empirical inquiry I narrowed 
these aims to investigate a specific type of creativity (i.e., improvisation), a specific 
domain of creativity (i.e., music), a specific group of creative people (i.e., musicians), 
and a specific type of neural activity (i.e., upper alpha-band synchronization in frontal 
brain regions).   
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The primary aim of this study was to use EEG to investigate whether frontal brain 
wave changes occurring during spontaneous creativity are different than during non-
spontaneous (i.e., deliberate) creativity.  Framing this aim as a research question, I asked: 
Does frontal alpha activity correspond to musical tasks of different creativity demands?  
As shown above, improvising artists’ descriptions of spontaneous composition are 
commensurate with neurocognitive evidence that supports the notion of a spontaneous 
processing mode occurring during creative ideation (Fink et al., 2007; Jauk et al., 2012; 
Jausovec, 1997; Krug et al., 2003).  EEG findings have shown that divergent thinking is 
accompanied by increased frontal alpha activity (Fink et al., 2007; Jauk et al., 2012).  
Divergent thinking tasks involve open-ended questions with many possible answers 
offering a greater opportunity for spontaneous processing than do convergent thinking 
tasks.  In the first part of this study I aimed to measure frontal alpha synchronization in 
musicians during a rote playback task, a free improvisation task, and a listening task.  
While the rote playback task is analogous to a convergent thinking task, the free 
improvisation task is analogous to a divergent thinking task.  Therefore, I expected to see 
patterns of neural activity during playback and during improvisation similar to those 
found in previous studies on alpha activity during divergent thinking tasks (Fink et al., 
2007; Jauk et al., 2012; Jausovec, 1997; Krug et al., 2003) and tasks of spontaneous 
artistic composition (Fink, Graif, & Neubauer, 2009; Martindale et al., 1984).  Namely, I 
hypothesized that EEGs would show increased alpha synchronization in frontal brain 
regions during spontaneous musical composition (i.e., improvisation) compared to during 
deliberate (i.e. rote) musical playing, and compared to when just listening to music.  This 
finding would support Dietrich’s (2004a) delineation of spontaneous and deliberate 
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processing modes during creative ideation, specifically supporting the notion that when 
accessing an intuitive stream of ideas people that are improvising are in a spontaneous 
mode.  Further, differences in brain activity occurring during time intervals of 
spontaneous creativity would support my above outlined experiential conceptualization 
of creativity, specifically that creativity is a distinct mental state characterized by specific 
cognitive processes. 
I further aimed to investigate the above differences in neural activity (i.e., frontal 
alpha synchronization) in participants with formal institutional training in creativity and 
participants without formal institutional training in creativity.  EEG findings have shown 
that alpha activity increases as a result of creativity training (Fink et al., 2006).  Also, in 
his differentiated model of gifts and talents, Gagné (2005) proposed that aptitudes, 
including those for creativity, develop into skills and talents though maturation and 
through learning.  The most structured type of learning he defined is formal institutional 
learning.  Therefore, I hypothesized that musicians with formal institutional training in 
improvisation (FITI) would show increased frontal alpha activity compared to musicians 
without formal institutional training in improvisation (non-FITI).  This finding would 
support Gagné’s (year) theory that skills are developed through formal institutional 
training.  It also may imply that formal institutional training is a viable method of 
nurturing creativity. 
The second aim of this study was to use EEG and the Alternate Uses Test to 
investigate the relationship between frontal alpha activity during tests of varying 
creativity demands (i.e., improvisation, deliberate playing, and listening) and aptitudes 
for divergent thinking and originality.  Framed as a research question, I asked: Do 
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aptitudes for divergent thinking and originality correlate with frontal alpha activity during 
improvisation, deliberate playback, and listening?  I further aimed to investigate whether 
this relationship would differ for those with previous formal institutional training in 
improvisation compared to those without previous formal institutional training in 
improvisation. 
EEG findings have shown that increased alpha activity during divergent thinking 
tasks is related to aptitude for creativity (Fink, Grabner, et al., 2009; Fink, Graif, & 
Neubauer, 2009; Fink & Neubauer, 2008; Jausovec, 2000; Razumnikova, 2007). 
Therefore, I hypothesized that aptitudes for divergent thinking and originality would 
positively correlate with frontal alpha synchronization during improvisation, and to a 
lesser degree or not at all with frontal alpha synchronization during deliberate playback 
and during listening.  This may suggest that the ability to enter into a spontaneous 
processing mode is related to a person’s aptitude for divergent thinking and originality.  
This finding may suggest that some people are more predisposed than others towards 
entering the creative mental state.  I further hypothesized that this correlation would be 
greater amongst those with previous formal institutional training in improvisation than 
those without. 
The third aim of this study was to use EEG and the Consensual Assessment 
Technique to investigate whether alpha activity during spontaneous composition, 
deliberate playing, or listening predicts the quality of an individual’s improvised 
performances as rated by domain experts.  Framed as a research question, I asked: Does 
alpha band synchronization during spontaneous composition predict improvised 
performance quality as rated by domain experts?  I also aimed to investigate whether this 
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predictive relationship would differ for those with formal institutional training in 
improvisation compared to those without formal institutional training in improvisation. 
Research has shown that increased alpha activity is related to aptitude for 
creativity (Fink & Neubauer, 2008; Grabner et al., 2007) and that right hemispheric alpha 
synchronization is greater during the generation of more compared to less original ideas 
(Grabner et al., 2007).  Therefore, I hypothesized that frontal alpha activity during 
improvisation would predict the innovative and overall quality of improvised 
performances as rated by domain experts.  Specifically, I hypothesized that those 
exhibiting increased alpha activity during improvisation would also have higher rated 
improvised performances.  I also hypothesized that this predictive relationship would be 
greater in those with previous formal institutional training in improvisation than those 
without previous formal institutional training in improvisation. 
The fourth aim of this study was to investigate if aptitude for creativity mediates 
the relationship between frontal alpha activity and improvised performance quality.  
Specifically, I aimed to investigate whether the relationship between frontal alpha 
synchronization during improvisation and expert ratings of improvised musical 
performances persists when controlling for aptitudes for creativity.  Therefore, my fourth 
research question was: Does aptitude for creativity mediate the relationship between 
frontal alpha synchronization during improvisation and quality of improvised 
performances as rated by domain experts?  Given that alpha activity is related to a 
person’s aptitude for creativity (Fink & Neubauer, 2006; Grabner et al., 2007), I 
hypothesized that aptitude for creativity would mediate the relationship between frontal 
brain activity during improvisation and expert ratings of improvised performances, 
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however I was uncertain of the effect size of this mediating role and if this role would be 
statistically significant.  I further hypothesized that this mediating role would be greater 
in those with previous formal institutional training in improvisation than those without 
previous formal institutional training in improvisation. 
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CHAPTER 2: Method 
Recruitment  
 Participants were recruited from the University of Western Ontario and from 
surrounding regions in southwestern Ontario. Upon gaining ethics approval, I contacted 
the Faculties of Education and of Music at this university and received permission to 
recruit (see appendix A for Ethics Approval Form).  I posted 8.5 x 11 inch posters at 
several locations around both faculties and at high traffic areas on campus (see appendix 
B for Poster).  Through the Associate Dean of Graduate Studies in Music, I emailed a 
brief description of the study with an attached letter of information to undergraduate and 
graduate students and to professors at the Faculty of Music (see appendix C for Letter of 
Information).  Also, members of my advisory committee and I contacted acquaintances 
and inquired about participation and about other musicians possibly interested in 
participating.  I described the study and provided letters of information to any 
respondents, and subsequently booked testing sessions.  Word of mouth also occurred, 
with a number of individuals contacting me after having heard about the study from 
participants. 
Participants 
Thirty-one musicians volunteered to participate (16 females, 18 males). The mean 
age was 28.1 years (SD = 14.3) with a minimum age of 18.5 years and maximum age of 
72.6 years.  Participants were required to be 18 years of age or older in order to minimize 
the effects of neurological maturation, specifically the development of the prefrontal 
cortex that is amongst the last brain structures to reach adult development (Chiron et al., 
1992; Chugani, Phelps, & Mazziotta, 1987).  Participants could be either male or female 
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as my hypotheses were not about sex-related differences, and were required to have at 
least two months of music experience, however they were not required to have any 
improvisation experience.  All participants included in the sample were right-handed and 
devoid of neurological disorders; these are standard inclusion criteria for an EEG study 
on creative cognition (e.g., Fink, Graif, & Neubauer, 2009).  Regarding noise 
interference, participants were excluded if their EEGs yielded less than 15 artifact free 
epochs (epoch interval = 256 pts, 510 ms) in the pre-stimulus EEG recordings.  Artifact 
rejection procedures will be elaborated in a later part of this paper.  Seven participants 
were excluded due to excessive noise artifacts (i.e., interference in the EEGs caused by 
blinking), one was excluded due to handedness (i.e., being ambidextrous), and one was 
excluded due to identification as a statistical outlier (>2 SD above the mean) as measured 
by frontal alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere during an improvisation task.  
After the exclusion of nine participants, 22 participants remained in the sample.  
Nine were female, and 13 were male.  The mean age was 26.2 years (SD = 9.5) with a 
minimum age of 18.5 years and a maximum age of 54.7 years.  The mean music 
experience (i.e., amount of experience playing music) was 18.5 years (SD = 11.7) with 
the least experienced having four years and the most experienced having 48 years.  The 
mean improvisation experience (i.e., amount of experience improvising musically) was 
10.2 years (SD = 13.1) with the least experienced having no experience and the most 
experienced having 48 years.   
 I used Gagné’s (2005) forms of aptitude development as a basis for grouping 
parameters.  Recall that in Gagné’s (2005) differentiated model of gifts and talents there 
are four forms of aptitude development with the most structured two forms being formal 
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non-institutional learning and formal institutional learning.  By Gagné’s (2005) 
definition, formal non-institutional learning refers to structured and planned autodidactic 
(i.e., self-taught) learning, whereas formal institutional learning refers to structured and 
planned learning that is institutionally based (e.g., going to school, enrolling in a music 
conservatory, attending sports camp).   
The sample in the current study was split into two groups based on participants’ 
previous training in improvisation.  Those with previous formal institutional training in 
improvisation (FITI) were included in a group that I called FITI, and those without 
previous formal institutional training in improvisation were included in a group that I 
called non-FITI.  Previous formal institutional training in this study included attendance 
at organized programs and courses (e.g., university, college, high school, Royal 
Conservatory of Music, other privately organized programs and courses lasting four 
weeks and more), and consistent private lessons over an extended duration (four weeks 
and more).  Previous non-formal training included being self-taught, and descriptions 
such as attending an occasional workshop at events, through books and articles, by 
hearing and watching others, and by experimenting. 
There were 12 participants in the non-FITI group.  Six were female, and six were 
male.  The mean age was 24.9 years (SD = 8.2) with a minimum age of 18.5 years and a 
maximum age of 46.6 years.  The mean music experience was 17.3 years (SD = 11.4) 
with the least experienced having four years and the most experienced having 45 years.  
The mean improvisation experience was eight years (SD = 12.4) with the least 
experienced having no experience and the most experienced having 45 years.  
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There were 10 participants in the FITI group.  Three participants were female, and 
seven were male. The mean age was 27.7 years (SD = 11.1) with a minimum age of 19.1 
years and a maximum age of 54.7 years.  The mean music experience was 19.9 years (SD 
= 12.5) with the least experienced having six years and the most experienced having 48 
years.  The mean improvisation experience was 12.8 years (SD = 14.1) with the least 
experienced having two years and the most experienced having 48 years.  
Measures 
 Alternate Uses Test.  The Alternate Uses Test (Guilford, 1967) assesses four 
dimensions of creative ability. Fluency refers to the number of uses of a common object 
(e.g., a brick) provided by the test-taker, originality to the uniqueness and unusualness of 
ideas, flexibility to the breadth of ideas, and elaboration to the amount of detail in the 
ideas (Guilford, 1950).  Many studies employing the Alternate Uses Test to investigate 
the neural correlates of creativity relied solely on scores of fluency (e.g., Fink, Graif, & 
Neubauer, 2009; Jauk et al., 2012; Martindale & Hines, 1975; Martindale et al., 1984), 
while a small number use scores of originality (e.g., Fink & Neubauer, 2008; Jung et al, 
2010).  Scoring and rating procedures are outlined in the Results section of this 
dissertation.  
Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire (MIPQ).  I created the 
Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire to assess the quality of improvised 
musical performances recorded during the testing sessions.  There are 10 questions in this 
questionnaire, nine of which are divided into three subscales called Innovation, 
Technique, and Musicality, plus an overall impression item.  Adjudicators rate 
performances using rating scales (1-10) for each question, with one representing a low 
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score and 10 representing a high score. (See appendix D for Musical Improvisation 
Performance Questionnaire).  
Raters of the Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire were experts in 
musical improvisation and improvised composition.  The first adjudicator was the vice-
president of the Canadian division of a major international record label, the second was a 
professor of jazz at Humber College in Toronto, Ontario, and an elite Canadian jazz 
pianist, and the third was a professor of music at The University of Western Ontario, and 
the director of the University’s jazz ensemble. The adjudicators independently rated the 
improvised music performances recorded during the EEG testing sessions at their own 
home or office.  I asked the experts to score the performances in terms of their universal 
value (as opposed to in relation to other performances in the sample) and to judge 
elements of innovation in terms of goodness combined with novelty (as opposed to only 
on novelty). 
Procedure 
Testing sessions took place in an EEG laboratory on the second floor of the 
Natural Sciences building at the University of Western Ontario.  Parts of the study (i.e., 
phases) involving EEG recording took place inside a small sound proofed room, and parts 
involving paper and pencil questionnaires took place in an adjoining room housing a desk 
and chair. 
Participants began by filling out a questionnaire to collect demographic data as 
well as data regarding musical and improvisational experience (see appendix E for 
Participant Information Questionnaire).  They then moved to a separate room for EEG 
preparation.  The EEG preparation procedure was as follows: (a) participants were asked 
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to sit in a comfortable chair; (b) participants were fitted with an elastic cap with sensors 
to record brain responses.  Sensors on this cap were oriented according to the 
international 10-20 system, which provided coverage across the entire scalp; (c) using a 
blunt-tipped syringe, electrolyte gel was inserted into holes in the cap/sensors; (d) 
additional sensors were also taped to the nose to act as a reference, and on the cheeks and 
forehead (above and below the eyes) to monitor eye movements and blinking.  Prior to 
attaching these sensors, the skin was cleaned using a sterile alcohol wipe.  Electrode 
impedances were kept below 5Ω (ohms), which maximized conductance from scalp to 
electrode and minimized the electrodes’ susceptibility to exogenous electromagnetic 
noise from the environment. The setup procedure took approximately 30 minutes. 
After setup, participants were seated in front of a computer screen and the 
Alternate Uses Test (AUT; Guilford, 1967) procedures were explained to them. They 
were told that the computer software would present pictures of four common household 
items, and that each item would be displayed for three minutes.  They were instructed to 
free associate or “come up with” as many uses for the objects as possible.  For each idea, 
they were to press a button on the desk in front of them, and then verbalize their idea into 
a microphone situated above the computer screen.  Participants were asked to continue 
free-associating ideas regarding uses for the entirety of the three minutes for each item.  
Household items in this study were a tin can, a sock, a pen, and a brick (see appendix F 
for pictures of Alternate Uses Test Items).  Fifteen seconds of pre-stimulus reference 
activity was recorded prior the Alternate Uses Test phase.  During this pre-stimulus 
interval participants focused on a fixation cross that was presented in the centre of the 
computer screen in front of them. 
57 
 
After completing the Alternate Uses Test phase of the testing session, a small 
two-octave MIDI keyboard was positioned in a manner that made it easily accessible for 
right-hand playing, and the procedure of the music phase of the study (outlined in the 
section below) was explained.  Before commencing this phase, participants were briefly 
shown music charts for the three 16-bar music progressions to be presented during the 
music phase, and were told the diatonic structures native to each progression (e.g., C-
blues scale, G-major scale, D-modal).  These charts had notation of the chord 
progressions, but were devoid of melodic transcriptions (See appendix G for Music 
Charts). 
Task conditions for the music phase progressed in the following order for each of 
the three pieces:  
1. Listen.  Participants were instructed to listen to the melody without playing.  
2. Learn.  Participants were told to learn to play the melody on the keyboard.  
3. Imagine playback.  Participants were told to imagine playing the melody as 
“straight” as possible and as closely to what they heard during the listen 
condition as possible.  
4. Actual playback.  Participants were prompted to physically play back the 
melody as closely to what they heard during the listen condition as possible.  
5. Imagine improvisation.  Participants were prompted to imagine improvising 
freely over the chord changes.  
6. Actual improvisation.  Participants were prompted to physically improvise 
freely over the chord changes.   
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Each of these conditions was 32-bars (approx. 80s) in duration, and participants 
progressed through the six conditions for each piece of music before proceeding to the 
next piece.  For all the above conditions, participants were directed to play with right 
hand only.  After explaining this procedure to the participants I reminded them to play 
with as little embellishment as possible during the playback conditions, and to be as 
creative and free as possible during the improvisation conditions.  Fifteen seconds of pre-
stimulus reference activity was recorded prior to the music phase.  As before the 
Alternate Uses Test phase, during the pre-stimulus interval participants focused on a 
fixation cross that was presented on the computer screen in front of them. 
During the experimental tasks (Alternate Uses Test and music tasks) outlined 
above, participants were presented with visual and auditory stimuli using E-prime 2.0 
software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA), while EEG activity was recorded 
from the surface of their scalp.  Visual stimuli were presented using a 19 inch CRT 
monitor, and auditory stimuli were presented using a near-field studio monitor style 
speaker (five inch woofer).  Both spoken ideas and MIDI keyboard music performances 
were recorded to hard disk as digital audio files using Apple Logic Express 8 (Apple Inc., 
Cupertino, CA). The music component of the study took approximately 18 minutes.   
Upon completion of the music phase, the EEG and facial electrodes were 
removed.  Participants were compensated with $20 and given a debriefing form 
explaining the procedure and background of the study (see appendix H for Debriefing 
Form). 
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EEG Procedures 
EEG acquisition.  Data were amplified at a gain of 500 using a SynAmps 
amplifier to boost the electrical signals received at electrodes situated over the scalp, and 
filtered online using 60 Hz notch and .1-100 Hz bandpass filters to limit the frequency 
range being recorded and minimize the intrusion of exogenous electrical noise.  These 
data were recorded with Acquire 4.2 (Neurosoft Inc., El Paso, TX), an EEG acquisition 
and recording software package, at a sampling rate of 500 Hz using a 32-channel cap 
with sintered Ag/AgCl electrodes (Quik-Caps; Neurosoft Inc., El Paso, TX) oriented 
according to the international 10-20 system, and referenced to the nose-tip.  The 
international 10-20 system is widely used as the arrangement of electrodes is according to 
measurements related to anatomical landmarks (Sanei & Chambers, 2007).  This 
arrangement provides standardized electrode placement across the scalp. Linked pairs of 
electrooculogram (EOG) electrodes recorded horizontal (electrodes on the outer canthi) 
and vertical (electrodes above and below the left eye) eye movements.  Impedances were 
kept below 5kΩ.  EEG data were recorded to continuous files on hard disk.  These 
continuous EEG files were later separated by experimental condition (e.g., Pre-stimulus, 
Listen, Playback, Improvisation) into unique data files.   
Artifact rejection. Artifact rejection was conducted to eliminate muscular noise 
caused by vertical and horizontal eye movements.  According to Neurosoft Inc. (2003), 
artifact rejection will “automatically reject (or accept) sweeps in which the voltage in a 
designated channel(s) exceeds defined criteria” (p. 102).  Time regions containing blinks 
and other artifacts were removed using a maximum voltage criterion of +/-100 µV at 
either horizontal (HEOG) or vertical electrooculogram (VEOG) electrode channels.  
When voltage in either of these channels exceeded these limitations, the surrounding 
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interval was rejected (Pre-artifact = 50 ms, Refractory period = 250 ms, Post-artifact = 50 
ms).  When referring to artifact rejection intervals, the term refractory period refers to “a 
span of time following the artifact during which additional artifacts will not be detected” 
(Neurosoft Inc., 2003, p. 105), and the pre- and post-artifact time spans refer to the 
interval of the rejected block (e.g., 50 ms before and 50 ms after).   
Data segmentation. Following artifact rejection, data was separated into lengths 
of a pre-determined duration called epochs.  For the purposes of this study, the 
continuous data was transformed into blink-free epochs spanning 510 ms in duration.  
This transform elicited a number of useable 510 ms sweeps per EEG file.  The number of 
sweeps varied by participant according to the amount of noise artifacts present in the 
EEGs.  The average number of accepted epochs/sweeps per condition was 26.95 (SD = 
3.8) for Pre-stimulus, 276.41 (SD = 72.4) for Listen, 300.64 (SD = 73.0) for Playback, 
and 286.86 (SD = 83.1) for Improvisation.  As mentioned earlier in this method section, 
participants whose epoch files elicited less than 15 useable sweeps during pre-stimulus 
baseline trials were eliminated from further analysis (n = 8). 
Epoch averaging.  Next, the epoch sweeps were averaged into a single 510ms 
sweep for each condition (e.g., Pre-stimulus average, Playback average, Improvisation 
average).  In order to arrive at a value representing task-related activity, EEGs in studies 
such as this (e.g., Fink, Graif, & Neubauer, 2009) are typically calculated in terms of 
power, as opposed to in terms of amplitude.  This makes it easier to calculate activity at a 
particular electrode site relative to a participant’s resting baseline activity, as opposed to 
in terms of absolute amplitude without a baseline reference.  Frequency domain 
averaging was performed wherein amplitude was “computed as a function of frequency” 
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(Neuroscan Inc., 2003, p. 107) and scaled in terms of power (µV squared, adapted from 
the Cooley-Tukey method).  For this study, I selected a resolution of 1.961 Hz to define 
bin width for frequencies, and a range of 250 Hz to define the largest frequency 
computed from the entire range gathered at electrode sites.  Resolution of bin width refers 
to the intervals by which the entire recorded frequency range is segmented and averaged.  
For this study, selecting a bin width of approximately 2 Hz provided frequency ranges 
corresponding to upper and lower bands of the spectral ranges (i.e., upper and lower 
alpha bands ranging from 8-10 Hz and 10-12 Hz).  
During this study, I chose to focus my investigation on the upper alpha band (10-
12 Hz), which is sensitive to group-wise differences in alpha synchronization related to 
tasks of varying creativity demands (Fink, Graif, & Neubauer, 2009).  Therefore, all 
frontal alpha synchronization data reported in this study pertain specifically to the upper 
alpha band. 
Off-line filtering, bad channel elimination.  After averaging the useable epochs 
by power, averaged sweeps were filtered by frequency bands defined as overall alpha (8-
12 Hz), low alpha (8-10 Hz), and high alpha (10-12 Hz).  Electrode channel signals were 
visually inspected, with exceedingly noisy ones eliminated from further analysis.   
Task-related power calculations, and electrode grouping.  Finally, EEG data 
were calculated in terms of task related power values.  These values represent the 
difference between cortical activity measured at an electrode site during a task activation 
interval and during a resting pre-stimulus reference interval.  To calculate task-related 
power at a given electrode site, power during the reference interval was subtracted from 
power during the activation interval.  This calculation was done for each electrode, for 
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each task (Listen, Playback, Improvisation), for each participant.  When reporting task-
related power, decreases from reference are expressed as negative values and referred to 
as desynchronization, whereas increases from reference are expressed as positive values 
and referred to as synchronization (Fink, Graif, & Neubauer, 2009) 
Electrodes were grouped for analysis as Front Left (FP1, F3, F7), Front Right 
(FP2, F4, F8), and Front All (FP1, FP2, F3, F4, FZ, F7, F8, FT7, FT8, FC3, FC4, FCZ).  
These abbreviations refer to the position of EEG cap electrodes.  For example, F3 refers 
to Frontal electrode number three, and FP1 refers to Frontal Parietal electrode number 
one.  Electrodes with odd numbers in their abbreviation are situated over the left 
hemisphere, and electrodes with even numbers over the right hemisphere.  The numbers 
themselves refer to the distance of the electrode from the midline, with larger numbers 
representing greater distance from that line (Luck, 2005).  For example, electrode F7 is 
further away from midline than F3.  Electrodes with a Z in their abbreviation are situated 
over the centre.  Data from the Front Left and Front Right electrode groups were used for 
further comparisons and analyses in this study. 
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CHAPTER 3: Results 
 The results section is divided into the following main subsections: (a) Demographic 
Differences Between Groups, (b) Reliability of Measures, (c) Electroencephalogram (d) 
Alternate Uses Test, (e) Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire, and (f) 
Partial Correlations.  In the first subsection data are presented describing between-groups 
differences based on a number of demographic variables, and in the next subsection, 
inter-rater reliability procedures and statistical analyses are presented.  In the third 
subsection data are presented describing neural activity occurring during music tasks.  
Here, a two-way repeated measures ANOVA with post hoc testing is presented showing 
within-groups and between-groups differences in task related upper alpha 
synchronization during music tasks.  In the fourth subsection data are presented 
describing between-groups differences in scores on the Alternate Uses Test, and 
correlations are presented describing the relationships between Alternate Uses Test 
fluency and originality scores, between Alternate Uses Test scores and experience, and 
between Alternate Uses Test scores and task-related upper alpha synchronization during 
music tasks.  In the next subsection data are presented describing between-groups 
differences in Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire scores, and correlations 
are presented describing the relationship between Musical Improvisation Performance 
Questionnaire subscales and task-related upper alpha synchronization during music tasks, 
and between Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire subscales and Alternate 
Uses Test scores.  In the final subsection results from a partial correlation analysis are 
presented describing the relationship between neural activity occurring during 
Improvisation and Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire scores, as mediated 
by Alternate Uses Test originality scores. 
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Demographic Differences between Groups  
 As mentioned above, participants were categorized into non-FITI and FITI groups 
based on whether they had previous formal institutional training in improvisation or not.  
Aside from this categorization factor, separate One-way ANOVAs were run to determine 
differences between non-FITI and FITI groups for each of age, music experience, and 
improvisation experience.  There were no statistically significant differences between 
groups in terms of age, F (1,20) = .466, p = .503; music experience, F (1,20) = .253, p = 
.620; or improvisation experience, F (1,20) = .721, p = .406.  These data show that there 
was homogeneity between the FITI and non-FITI groups in terms of age and experience. 
Reliability of Measures 
 Alternate Uses Test.  I scored the Alternate Uses Test for both fluency and 
originality.  Fluency scores were calculated by summing the number of ideas per 
participant, after eliminating redundancies.  Two raters (myself and a PhD student 
research assistant) identified redundant ideas in participants’ lists independently.  The 
raters’ scores were averaged to calculate a final (mean) fluency score for each participant. 
 Originality scores were assessed by assigning values for each idea.  These values 
were between one and five, with a score of five indicating high originality and a score of 
one indicating low originality.  Raters scored participants’ ideas based on the following 
criteria: A score of five characterized an idea as unique, four as unusual, three as 
somewhat novel, two as somewhat expected, and one as expected.  These values were 
further characterized as follows: five is a response expected from only 0-2 % of the 
population, four is expected from 2.1-5 %, three is expected from 5.1-25%, two is 
expected from 25-50%, and one is expected from 50% or more of the population.  Then, 
65 
 
for each participant, the numbers of unusual (4) and unique (5) responses were summed 
to derive the final (mean) originality score. 
A Pearson product-moment correlation was run to determine inter-rater reliability 
for scores of fluency and originality.  There was a strong statistically significant positive 
correlation between rater one’s fluency scores and rater two’s fluency scores, r(20) = 
.981, p < 0.01.  There was also a strong statistically significant positive correlation 
between rater one’s originality scores and rater two’s originality scores, r(20) = .708, p < 
0.01.  These data indicate consistency of scoring across raters for both fluency and 
originality. 
Music Improvisation Performance Questionnaire.  Pearson product-moment 
correlations were run to determine inter-rater reliability for Innovation, Technique, and 
Musicality scores.  Correlations for all subscales between adjudicators one, two, and 
three are presented in Table 1. The average of all inter-rater correlations between 
subscales was strong, r(20) = .823, p < 0.01, indicating consistency of scoring across 
subscales.  
Pearson product-moment correlations were also run to determine inter-rater 
reliability for subscale totals, and measure totals.  Correlations for all subscales between 
adjudicators one, two, and three are presented in Table 2. The average of inter-rater 
correlations for subscale totals and for full measure totals was strong, r(20) = .838, p < 
0.01, indicating consistency of scoring for the total questionnaire across adjudicators.   
Given the inter-rater consistency in scoring of subscales, subscale totals, and 
overall measure totals, scores for the three adjudicators were averaged to yield composite 
subscale, subscale total, and measure total scores.
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Table 1 
Inter-rater Correlations of Mean Subscale Scores of the Music Improvisation Performance Questionnaire by Adjudicator 
 Adj 1 Inn Adj 1 Tech Adj 1 Mus Adj 2 Inn Adj 2 Tech Adj 2 Mus Adj 3 Inn Adj 3 Tech Adj 3 Mus 
Adj1 Inn 1         
Adj 1 Tech .988** 1        
Adj 1 Mus .982** .996** 1       
Adj 2 Inn .832** .849** .836** 1      
Adj 2 Tech .764** .804** .781** .934** 1     
Adj 2 Mus .772** .810** .792** .921** .988** 1    
Adj 3 Inn .904** .893** .897** .784** .700** .718** 1   
Adj 3 Tech .903** .902** .900** .847** .739** .755** .946** 1  
Adj 3 Mus .899** .901** .903** .816** .735** .748** .900** .951** 1 
Note. Correlations are provided based on ratings for the total sample (n=22). Bold type with ** denotes p < .01 level, 1-tailed.   
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Table 2 
Inter-rater Correlations of Mean Subscale Totals and Mean Measure Totals of the Music Improvisation Performance Questionnaire 
by Adjudicator 
 Adj 1 Subscales Adj 1 Measure Adj 2 Subscales Adj 2 Measure Adj 3 Subscales Adj 3 Measure 
Adj 1 Subscales 1      
Adj 1 Measure .998** 1     
Adj 2 Subscales .818** .817** 1    
Adj 2 Measure .822** .823** .998** 1   
Adj 3 Subscales .925** .921** .786** .785** 1  
Adj 3 Measure .914** .910** .775** .775** .998** 1 
Note. Correlations are provided based on ratings for the total sample (n=22). Bold type with ** denotes p < .01 level, 1-tailed.   
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Pearson product-moment correlations were run to determine relationships 
between Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire subscales, subscale totals, 
and full measure totals with one another.  The mean of correlations between subscales 
was strong and statistically significant, r(20) = .983, p < .01.  Also, the mean of 
correlations between subscale totals and full measure totals was strong and statistically 
significant, r(20) = .999, p < .01.  These correlations indicate stability of scoring across 
subscales, showing that the Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire provided a 
reliable measure of the overall quality of participants’ performances. 
Electroencephalogram (EEG) 
Descriptive Data.  Frontal upper alpha synchronization in the left and right 
hemispheres during the Listen, Playback, and Improvisation tasks, reported as task-
related power (TRP) values, are presented for FITI and non-FITI groups in Table 3.  
Recall that to calculate task-related power at a given electrode site, power during the 
reference interval is subtracted from power during the activation interval.  Decreases 
from reference are expressed as negative values and referred to as desynchronization, 
whereas increases from reference are expressed as positive values and referred to as 
synchronization (Fink, Graif, & Neubauer, 2009). In the non-FITI group, frontal upper 
alpha synchronization in the left hemisphere was low during Listen (M = .15, SD = .67, 
SE = .35), Playback (M = .06, SD = 1.00, SE = .43), and Improvisation (M = .25, SD = 
1.07, SE = .48), whereas frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere was 
high during Listen (M = 1.15, SD = 2.75, SE = .82), and then moderate during Playback 
(M = .85, SD = 2.46, SE = .83), and during Improvisation (M = .82, SD = 2.06, SE = .92).   
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In the FITI group, frontal upper alpha synchronization in the left hemisphere was 
modest during Listen (M = .48, SD = 1.62, SE = .38), increased during Playback (M = 
.69, SD = 1.94, SE = .47), and increased further during Improvisation (M = .87, SD = 
2.19, SE = .53), while in the right hemisphere it was high during Listen (M = 1.19, SD = 
2.93, SE = .90) increased during Playback (M = 1.58, SD = 3.28, SE = .90), and then 
increased to be very high during Improvisation (M = 2.51, SD = 4.19, SE = 1.00).   
ANOVA.  To test within-group and between-group differences in task related 
upper alpha (de)synchronization during the music tasks, I employed a two-way repeated 
measures ANOVA.  
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA was calculated with training group as the 
between subjects factor and music task and cerebral hemisphere as within subjects 
factors.  The task factor consisted of three levels (Listen, Playback, and Improvisation) 
and the hemisphere factor of two levels (left and right).  The dependent variable was 
frontal upper alpha synchronization.  
The main effects for task, F (2, 40) = 1.695, p > .05, and hemisphere, F (1, 20) = 
3.536, p > .05, were non-significant.  Also, the interactions for task by improvisation 
training group and hemisphere by improvisation training group were non-significant F (2, 
40) = 2.478, p > .05, and F (1, 20) = .084, p > .05, respectively. 
However, the task-by-hemisphere-by-group interaction was significant, and 
provided a very large effect size, F (2, 40) = 4.425, p < .05, η2 = .181.  Mauchly’s test 
indicated that sphericity was assumed, X2 (2) = 3.109, p = .211. Figures 1 and 2 show task 
related power changes in frontal upper alpha synchronization in the left and right 
hemispheres during the Listen, Playback, and Improvisation tasks for the non-FITI and  
 Figure 1. Frontal Upper Alpha Synchronization During Music Tasks in the Non
Group. For the left hemisphere 95% CIs for listen, playback, and improvisation are [
.87], [-.84, .96], and [-.76, 1.26] respectively and for the right hemisphere are [
[-.87, 2.57], and [-1.10, 2.75] respectively.
 
Figure 2. Frontal Upper Alpha Synchronization During Music Tasks in the FITI Group. 
For the left hemisphere 95% CIs for listen, playback, and improvisation are [
.30, 1.67], and [-.24, 1.97] respectively and for the right hemisphere are [
.31, 3.46], and [.40, 4.62] respectively.
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FITI groups.  Note the increase in frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right 
hemisphere during improvisation in Figure 2. 
Post hoc testing.  ANOVA is an omnibus test statistic that cannot reveal which 
specific groups within each factor significantly differ from one another.  Therefore post 
hoc testing using Fisher’s Least Significant Differences (LSD) procedure was used.  
Fisher’s LSD was chosen to optimize the statistical power of the multiple comparisons 
analyses.  According to Kirk (1995), Fisher’s procedure is only recommended for 
experiments having three or less treatment levels, because when the number of treatment 
levels exceeds three, the test “fails to control the maximum family-wise error rate” (p. 
123).  Given that my study’s experiment consisted of three treatment levels (Listen, 
Playback, and Improvisation), Fisher’s LSD procedure was appropriate. 
Task-related differences.  Post hoc testing using the Fisher LSD test revealed that 
in the non-FITI group there was no significant difference in frontal upper alpha 
(de)synchronization in either hemispheres during the Improvisation task in comparison to 
the Playback task.  Also, in the non-FITI group there was no significant difference in 
frontal upper alpha (de)synchronization in either hemisphere during the Improvisation 
task in comparison to the Listen task.  Conversely, in the FITI group frontal upper alpha 
synchronization in the right hemisphere was different during the Improvisation task (M = 
2.51, SD = 4.19) compared to during the Playback task (M = 1.58, SD = 3.28).  
Furthermore, in this group frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere 
was different during the Improvisation task (M = 2.51, SD = 4.19) compared to during the 
Listen task (M = 1.19, SD = 2.93).   
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Taken together, these findings show differences in frontal upper alpha 
synchronization in the right hemisphere when musicians that have formal institutional 
training in improvisation improvise compared to when they engage in a rote playback 
task, and to when they engage in a passive listening task.  Specifically, the results show 
that FITI musicians exhibit substantially more frontal upper alpha synchronization in the 
right hemisphere when engaged in the Improvisation task compared to when engaged in 
the rote Playback task, and even more frontal upper alpha synchronization when engaged 
in the Improvisation task compared to when engaged in the Listen task (see Table 3).  In 
both comparisons, significance levels indicate a low likelihood that these findings are due 
to type I errors.  These results show that in terms of frontal upper alpha synchronization 
in the right hemisphere during Improvisation the non-FITI and FITI groups are not 
homogeneous. 
Correlations. Within-group correlations were run to determine the relationships 
between frontal upper alpha synchronization in left and right hemispheres, and between 
frontal upper alpha synchronization and age and experience.  According to Marzban, 
Illian, Morison, and Mourad (2013), if data consist of groups, it is important to divide the 
data into components and to measure within-group correlations.  Failure to acknowledge 
groups when they are present may result in the loss of valuable information about 
associations between variables. According to Muijs (2011), an effect size of 
approximately .30 can be considered modest, of approximately .50 can be considered 
moderate, and of approximately .80 can be strong.  In cases when my a priori predictions 
were directional based on conceptual fit with previous research, one-tailed tests were 
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations for Frontal High Alpha Synchronization in Left and Right Hemispheres by Training Groups 
   Left Hemisphere  Right Hemisphere  
Group n Listen  Playback Improvisation Listen Playback Improvisation 
        
Non-FITI 12 .15 (.67) .06 (1.0) .25 (1.07) 1.15 (2.75) .85 (2.46) .82 (2.06) 
FITI 10 .48 (1.62) .69 (1.94) .87 (2.19) 1.19 (2.93) 1.58 (3.28) 2.51 (4.19) 
Note. In each column, mean scores are presented for each task with standard deviations in brackets.  For each hemisphere, 
task-related changes of EEG alpha band power (TRP) in the upper alpha band (10-12 Hz) are presented from left to right in 
order of increasing creativity demands.  Means were higher for the FITI group, wherein synchronization in the right 
hemisphere increased with greater task demands, peaking during improvisation. 
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used in order to optimize statistical power (Martella, Nelson, Morgan, & Marchand-
Martella, 2013). 
Correlations of alpha synchronization in left and right hemispheres.  Pearson 
product-moment correlations were run to determine the relationship between frontal 
upper alpha synchronization in the left and right hemisphere during all tasks for non-FITI 
and FITI groups.  In the non-FITI group there were no statistically significant correlations 
between frontal upper alpha synchronization in the left and right hemispheres for any 
tasks (see Table 4). 
Conversely, in the FITI group there were strong positive correlations between 
frontal upper alpha synchronization in the left and right hemispheres for all tasks, with all 
correlations being statistically significant (see Table 5). Notably, there were correlations 
between frontal upper alpha synchronization in the left and right hemispheres during 
Listen, r(8) = .831, p = .001; Playback r(8) = .847, p = .001; and Improvisation r(8) = 
.747, p = .006.  These findings show that in the FITI group, frontal upper alpha 
synchronization increased simultaneously across hemispheres during all tasks. 
Correlations of Task-related alpha synchronization with experience.  Pearson 
product-moment correlations were run to determine the relationship of frontal upper 
alpha synchronization in the left and right hemispheres with participant age, music 
experience, and improvisation experience for the non-FITI and FITI groups. 
In the non-FITI group, there were no significant correlations between frontal 
upper alpha synchronization in the left hemisphere during Listen, Playback, and 
Improvisation and any of participant age, music experience, and improvisation 
experience.  However, there were a number of moderate statistically significant negative  
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Table 4 
Non-FITI Group (n=12) Correlations between Frontal High Alpha Synchronization in 
Left and Right Hemispheres, by Experimental Task 
 
Right Listen Right Play Right Improvise 
Left Listen .040 .104 -.026 
Left Play -.177 .214 .175 
Left Improvise -.413 .079 .104 
Note. Correlation coefficients are provided above.  For each hemisphere, tasks are 
presented from left to right in order of increasing creative demands. Bold type with 
* would denote significance at the 0.05 level and with ** at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
 
Table 5 
FITI Group (n=10) Correlations between Frontal High Alpha Synchronization in Left 
and Right Hemispheres, by Experimental Task 
 
Right Listen Right Play Right Improvise 
Left Listen .831** .832** .755** 
Left Play .825** .847** .739** 
Left Improvise .761** .780** .747** 
Note. Correlation coefficients are provided above.  For each hemisphere, tasks are 
presented from left to right in order of increasing creative demands. Bold type with 
** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. 
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correlations in the right hemisphere.  These correlations were largest between 
Improvisation and music experience, r(10) = -.559, p = .029, and between Improvisation 
and improvisation experience, r(10) = -.579, p = .024.  As shown in Table 6, there were 
also a number of moderate negative correlations between frontal upper alpha 
synchronization in the right hemisphere during Listen, Playback, and Improvisation, and 
age, music experience, and improvisation experience that were significant. 
In the FITI group, there were strong statistically significant positive correlations 
between frontal upper alpha synchronization in the left hemisphere during all tasks, and 
age, music experience, and improvisation experience (see Table 7).  However, in the FITI 
group there were no statistically significant correlations between frontal upper alpha 
synchronization in the right hemisphere during any tasks and age, music experience, and 
improvisation experience. 
Alternate Uses Test (AUT) 
 Using the t-test for independent samples, I found no significant difference in 
Alternate Uses Test fluency scores between the non-FITI (M = 39.0, SD = 14.26) and 
FITI (M = 35.2, SD = 11.2) groups, t(20) = .25, p > .05.  Also, I found no significant 
difference in Alternate Uses Test originality scores between the non-FITI (M = 2.1, SD = 
2.6) and FITI (M = 1.4, SD = 1.5) groups, t(20) = .75, p > .05.  Therefore it can be 
summarized that the non-FITI and FITI groups did not significantly differ in terms of 
fluency and originality scores. 
Correlations of fluency and originality.  Pearson product-moment correlations 
were run to determine the relationships between fluency and with originality in the non-
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Table 6 
Non-FITI Group (n=12) Correlations of Frontal High Alpha Synchronization During Music Tasks with Age, Music Experience, and 
Improvisation Experience, by Cortical Hemisphere. 
   Left Hemisphere  Right Hemisphere  
  Listen  Playback Improvisation Listen Playback Improvisation 
        
Age  -.025 .113 .006 -.421 -.290 -.356 
MUS exp  -.087 -.082 .010 -.479 -.528* -.559* 
IMPRV exp  .006 .014 .099 -.514* -.471 -.579* 
Note. Correlation coefficients are provided above.  For each hemisphere, tasks are presented from left to right in order of 
increasing creativity demands. Bold type with * denotes significance at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table 7 
FITI Group (n=10) Correlations of Frontal High Alpha Synchronization During Music Tasks with Age, Music Experience, and 
Improvisation Experience, by Cortical Hemisphere. 
   Left Hemisphere  Right Hemisphere  
  Listen  Playback Improvisation Listen Playback Improvisation 
        
Age  .758** .739** .711* .471 .450 .390 
MUS exp  .745** .738** .752** .538 .515 .515 
IMPRV exp  .795** .761** .784** .549 .537 .542 
Note. Correlation coefficients are provided above.  For each hemisphere, tasks are presented from left to right in order of 
increasing creativity demands. Bold type with * denotes significance at the 0.05 level and with ** at the 0.01 level. 
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FITI and FITI groups.  In the non-FITI group (n = 12), there was a moderate positive 
correlation between fluency and originality, which was statistically significant, r(11) = 
.685, p = .007.  In the FITI group (n = 10), there was a moderate positive correlation 
between fluency and originality, which was also statistically significant, r(8) = .614, p = 
.030.  The similarity of these correlations across groups indicates a stable correlation of 
these measures with one another.  I expected this, as these tests reportedly measure 
aspects of the same construct (Guilford, 1967). 
Correlations of fluency and originality with experience.  Pearson product-
moment correlations were run to determine the relationships between fluency and 
originality scores and participants’ age, music experience, and improvisation experience 
for the non-FITI and FITI groups.  In both groups there were no significant correlations 
between fluency or originality and age and experience factors.   
Correlations of fluency and originality with task-related alpha 
synchronization.  Pearson product-moment correlations were run to determine the 
relationships between originality and fluency scores and frontal upper alpha 
synchronization in the right hemisphere during Listen, Playback, and Improvisation for 
the non-FITI group, and for the FITI group.  
In both the non-FITI and FITI groups there were no significant correlations 
between fluency and frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere during 
any of Listen, Playback, and Improvisation.  Also, in the non-FITI group there were no 
significant correlations between originality and frontal upper alpha synchronization in 
any of Listen, Playback, and Improvisation (see Table 8), and in the FITI group, there 
were no significant correlations between originality and either Listen or Playback (see 
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Table 8 
Non-FITI Group (n = 12) Correlations between Alternate Uses Test Originality, 
Alternate Uses Test Fluency, and Frontal High Alpha Synchronization in the Right 
Hemisphere during Listen, Playback, and Improvisation Tasks 
 Originality Fluency 
Originality 1  
Fluency .685* 1 
EEG Listen .033 .124 
EEG Playback .121 .099 
EEG Improvisation .205 .188 
Note. Correlation coefficients are provided above.  Bold type with * denotes 
significance at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
 
Table 9 
FITI Group (n = 10) Correlations between Alternate Uses Test Originality, Alternate 
Uses Test Fluency, and Frontal High Alpha Synchronization in the Right Hemisphere 
during Listen, Playback, and Improvisation Tasks 
 Originality Fluency 
Originality 1  
Fluency .614* 1 
EEG Listen .359 -.058 
EEG Playback .337 -.057 
EEG Improvisation .566* .176 
Note. Correlation coefficients are provided above.  Bold type with * denotes significance 
at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
 
 
  
80 
 
Table 9), however there was a moderate statistically significant positive correlation 
between originality and frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere 
during the Improvisation task, r(8) = .566, p = .044.  This finding supports my 
hypotheses that (a) originality would be related to frontal upper alpha synchronization 
during Improvisation to a greater degree than during Listen and Playback, and (b) that 
this relationship would be greater in musicians with FITI than in musicians without. 
Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire (MIPQ) 
Subscales of the Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire were scored 
on a scale of 1-10 with 10 being high.  Overall, experts rated the improvised 
performances moderately, with the lowest score being 2.06, and the highest being 7.51. 
The subscale means ranged from 4.45 to 4.74 with the subscale total mean at 4.59, and 
the full total mean at 4.54 (see Table 10).   
 Using the t-test for independent samples, I found no significant differences in 
Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire Innovation, Technique, and 
Musicality subscale scores between the non-FITI (M = 4.56, 4.27, 4.36, SD = 1.3, 1.6, 
1.6) and FITI (M = 4.95, 4.68, 4.82, SD = 1.3, 1.5, 1.6) groups: Innovation, t(20) = -.692, 
p = > .05; Technique, t(20) = -.620, p >.05; Musicality, t(20) = -.696, p >.05.  Also, t-
tests for independent samples showed no significant differences in Musical Improvisation 
Performance Questionnaire subscales total and overall total scores between the non-FITI 
(M = 4.40, 4.35, SD = 1.5, 1.5) and FITI (M = 4.82, 4.77, SD = 1.5, 1.5) groups: subscales 
total, t(20) = -.696, p >.05; overall total, t(20) = -.696, p >.05.  Therefore, it can be 
summarized that the non-FITI and FITI groups did not significantly differ in terms of 
scores on the Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire. 
81 
 
Table 10 
Means and Standard deviations for Subscales, Subscale Total, and Full Total of the 
Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire 
 Innovation Technique Musicality Sub Total Full Total 
Non-FITI 4.6 (1.33) 4.3 (1.58) 4.4 (1.55) 4.4 (1.47) 4.3 (1.46) 
FITI 4.9 (1.28) 4.7 (1.53) 4.8 (1.56) 4.8 (1.45) 4.8 (1.50) 
Total  4.7 (1.29) 4.5 (1.53) 4.6 (1.54) 4.6 (1.45) 4.5 (1.46) 
Note. The Non-FITI group (n=12), FITI group (n=10), and total sample (n=22) are 
represented in this table.  In each column, mean scores are presented for each 
subscale or total with standard deviations in brackets.  Scores are averages from 1-
10 rating scale. 
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I expected the Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire scores to be 
low, as adjudicators were instructed to score the performances on an absolute scale as 
opposed to in reference to others in the current sample, and most of the participants were 
not experienced jazz professionals.  I also expected trained participants to score higher 
than non-trained participants, which was not significantly shown in these data. 
Correlations of MIPQ subscales with task-related alpha synchronization. 
Pearson product-moment correlations were run to determine the relationships between 
Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire subscales, subscale totals, and full 
measure totals and frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere during 
Listen, Playback, and Improvisation for the non-FITI and FITI groups.   
In the non-FITI group there were no significant correlations between any of the 
music rating measures and frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere 
during any of Listen, Playback, or Improvisation (see Table 11).  Conversely, in the FITI 
group there were numerous positive correlations between the Musical Improvisation 
Performance Questionnaire measures and frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right 
hemisphere during Improvisation (see Table 12).  These correlations were moderate and 
statistically significant for the Musicality subscale, r(8) = .592, p = .036; subscales total, 
r(8) = .560, p = .046; and full measure total, r(8) = .561, p = .046.  Furthermore, there 
were moderate correlations between frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right 
hemisphere during Improvisation and both the Innovation, r(8) = .543, p = .052, and 
Technique, r(8) = .539, p = .054, subscales, however these correlations narrowly missed 
statistical significance. 
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Table 11 
Non-FITI Group (n = 12) Correlations between the Musical Improvisation Performance 
Questionnaire Subscales, Subscale Total, and Full Total and Frontal High Alpha 
Synchronization in the Right Hemisphere during Music Experiment Tasks. 
 Listen Playback Improvise 
Innovation .147 .030 -.007 
Technique .179 .063 -.015 
Musicality .108 .016 -.074 
Subscale Total .146 .037 -.033 
Full Total .117 .018 -.053 
Note. Bold type with * would denote significance at the 0.05 level and with ** at the 
0.01 level.  No significant correlations at either levels or below in this table. 
 
 
 
 
Table 12 
FITI Group (n = 10) Correlations between the Musical Improvisation Performance 
Questionnaire Subscales, Subscale Total, and Full Total and Frontal High Alpha 
Synchronization in the Right Hemisphere during Music Experiment Tasks. 
 Listen Playback Improvise 
Innovation .462 .423 .543 
Technique .446 .403 .539 
Musicality .488 .448 .592* 
Subscale Total .467 .426 .560* 
Full Total .461 .422 .561* 
Note. Bold type with * denotes significance at the 0.05 level and with ** at the 0.01 
level. 
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Correlations of MIPQ with AUT.  Pearson product-moment correlations were 
run to determine the relationships between Musical Improvisation Performance 
Questionnaire subscales, subscale totals, and full measure totals and Alternate Uses Test 
originality and fluency scores for the non-FITI and FITI groups. 
In the non-FITI group, there were no significant correlations between Musical 
Improvisation Performance Questionnaire scores and either fluency or originality (see 
Table 13).  In the FITI group, there were no significant correlations between Musical 
Improvisation Performance Questionnaire scores and fluency, however, in this group 
there were moderate to strong, statistically significant correlations between Musical 
Improvisation Performance Questionnaire subscales and originality.  The Musicality 
subscale had the highest correlation with originality, r(8) = .731, p = .008, followed by 
Technique, r(8) = .699, p = .012, followed by Innovation, r(8) = .662, p = .018.  Also, 
there were strong correlations between Musical Improvisation Performance 
Questionnaire subscale totals and originality, r(8) = .701, p = .012, and Musical 
Improvisation Performance Questionnaire full measure totals and originality, r(8) = .714, 
p = .010. 
Partial Correlations 
 Given the correlations found in the FITI group between frontal upper alpha 
synchronization and originality, frontal upper alpha synchronization and Musical 
Improvisation Performance Questionnaire scores, and originality and Musical 
Improvisation Performance Questionnaire scores, I hypothesized that originality may be a 
mediator between frontal upper alpha synchronization and Musical Improvisation 
Performance Questionnaire scores.  Partial correlation is a method of determining if a 
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Table 13 
Non-FITI Group (n = 12) Correlations between Alternate Uses Test Originality, 
Alternate Uses Test Fluency, Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire 
Subscales, and Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire Totals 
 Originality Fluency 
Originality 1  
Fluency .612* 1 
Innovation .121 -.167 
Technique .039 -.239 
Musicality -.013 -.282 
Subscales total .046 -.235 
Full Total .034 -.237 
Note.  The non-FITI group is represented in this table (n=12). Bold type with * denotes 
significance at the 0.05 level and with ** at the 0.01 level 
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third variable is a mediator in a correlation between two other variables (Martella et al., 
2013). 
 Baron and Kenny (1986) defined three criteria that need to be present in order for a 
variable to be considered as a mediator in a relationship between two other variables: (a) 
the potential mediating variable must be significantly correlated with the two other 
variables, (b) the two other variables must be correlated with one another, and (c) when 
the mediating variable is controlled for, the correlation between the two other variables 
must cease to be significant. 
 Zero order correlations in the FITI group between originality and Musical 
Improvisation Performance Questionnaire scores were significant and moderate to strong: 
Innovation, r(8) = .662, p = .018; Technique, r(8) = .699, p = .012; Musicality, r(8) = 
.731, p = .008; Subscales Total, r(8) = .701, p = .012; Overall Total, r(8) = .714, p = .010.  
Originality and frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere during 
Improvisation were also significantly correlated, r(8) = .566, p = .044.  Given that 
significant correlations were also found between frontal upper alpha synchronization in 
the right hemisphere during Improvisation and Musical Improvisation Performance 
Questionnaire scores: Musicality, r(8) = .592, p = .036; Subscales Total, r(8) = .560, p = 
.046; Overall Total, r(8) = .561, p = .046, additional analysis was conducted to determine 
if originality was acting as a mediating variable. 
 I ran a partial correlation to determine the relationship between frontal upper alpha 
synchronization in the right hemisphere during Improvisation and Musical Improvisation 
Performance Questionnaire scores, controlling for originality.  In this relationship, all the 
earlier mentioned criteria for mediation have been met.  That is (a) originality was 
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significantly correlated with both frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right 
hemisphere during Improvisation and with Musical Improvisation Performance 
Questionnaire scores, (b) frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere 
during Improvisation was significantly correlated with Musical Improvisation 
Performance Questionnaire scores, and (c) the partial correlations (1-tailed) were non-
significant when controlling for originality: Musicality, r(7) = .316, p = .204; Subscales 
Total, r(7) = .277, p = .235; Overall Total, r(7) = .271, p = .240: and were substantially 
reduced compared to the zero order correlation coefficients.  Thus, in the FITI group the 
relation of frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere during 
Improvisation and Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire scores was 
mediated by originality. 
 The above findings show that for those with previous FITI, frontal upper alpha 
synchronization in the right hemisphere during Improvisation predicts the quality of 
improvised performances.  However, the above partial correlation shows that this 
prediction is only true for those with aptitude towards originality.  This suggests that 
formal education in improvisation acts as a catalyst for aptitudes towards creativity. 
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CHAPTER 4: Discussion 
EEG 
 The primary aim of this study was to investigate differences in frontal brain activity 
occurring between tasks with high and low creativity demands.  I operationalized this aim 
by recording EEGs while musicians listened to, played back, and improvised jazz 
melodies.  I hypothesized that musicians would show increased frontal upper alpha band 
activity during more creative tasks compared to during less creative tasks, and that this 
effect would be more evident in those with previous FITI than those without. 
 Task-related differences in alpha synchronization.  Two-way repeated measures 
ANOVA showed that frontal upper alpha synchronization increased as a function of an 
interaction between task, hemisphere, and FITI groups.  Through post hoc analysis using 
Fisher’s LSD, I teased apart the interaction and revealed that there were significant task 
related differences between frontal upper alpha synchronization during Improvisation and 
Playback, and during Improvisation and Listen.  In other words, amongst those with 
previous FITI, alpha synchronization was greater while musicians improvised than while 
they played back melodies and was even greater than while they listened to melodies.   
 Given Dietrich’s (2004a) theory that alpha activity signifies spontaneous processing 
and Fink, Graif, & Neubauer’s (2009) findings that showed alpha synchronization 
occurring during the spontaneous composition of dance pieces, I interpret the increased 
frontal upper alpha synchronization that occurred while musicians improvised melodies 
as evidence of an underlying creative mental state characterized by immersion in the 
spontaneous processing mode.  Dietrich (2004a) conceptualized the spontaneous 
processing mode itself as a distinct mental state characterized by the manifestation of 
intuitive thoughts in working memory (Dietrich, 2004a), and I conceptualized creativity 
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as a distinct mental state that includes (a) engagement in an activity, (b) spontaneous 
processing of thoughts, and (c) the expression of these thoughts through a medium.  What 
delineates the creative mental state from the spontaneous processing mode is that in the 
creative mental state the creative person is engaged in an activity and is expressing 
intuitive thoughts as they manifest in working memory.  As such, spontaneous processing 
is actualized into the corporeal world; it becomes active and its bounty is externalized 
through expression.  Accordingly, spontaneous processing is a quintessential feature of 
the creative mental state.  In fact, it is so representative of the creative mental state that I 
use the terms creative mental state and spontaneous processing mode interchangeably 
depending on context.   
 Although increased frontal alpha activity during creative ideation was initially 
assumed to signify cortical idling (Dietrich, 2003; Pfurtscheller, 1999; Pfurtscheller et al., 
1996), more recent EEG findings have consistently shown that increased alpha activity 
during creative cognition likely signifies internally oriented attention, suspension of 
external bottom-up stimulation, and top-down processing (Benedek et al., 2011; Fink & 
Benedek, 2013).  Therefore, I interpret that top-down processing and internal focus of 
attention, and not cortical idling, likely characterized the creative mental state that 
occurred while participants in the current study improvised.  In order to gain further 
insight into this latter interpretation further research is needed.  For example, researchers 
could pair artists’ reports (i.e., interviews) on their creative processes during 
improvisation with EEG recordings.  In such reports, researchers could question 
participants on experiences that characterize top-down processing and on participants’ 
recollections of the direction in which their attention was focused (e.g., internally, 
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externally) during spontaneous processing tasks compared to during deliberate processing 
tasks.  These experiential recollections can then be compared to frontal upper alpha 
synchronization to see if participants with increased synchronization report experiences 
characteristic of top-down processing and internal focus of attention. 
 Lateralization of creativity.  The ANOVA and post hoc analysis showed that 
amongst those with previous FITI there was significantly and substantially greater frontal 
upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere while musicians spontaneously 
composed melodies compared to while they played back melodies deliberately, and even 
greater frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere while musicians 
improvised melodies compared to while they listened to melodies.  It is notable that these 
brain-wave changes occurred in the right hemispheres of those with previous FITI.   
 Previous research has not conclusively established that alpha activity during 
creative cognition is more nascent to either the left or right hemisphere (Dietrich & 
Kanso, 2010).  However, a pattern has emerged in the literature that may indicate a 
special role for the right hemisphere as related to creative ideation.  Specifically, previous 
research has shown increased frontal alpha activity in the right hemisphere during the 
generation of more original ideas (Grabner et al., 2007), amongst people with high 
aptitudes for creativity (Fink, Grabner et al., 2009), and amongst people that have had 
training in creative ideation (Fink et al., 2011).  Furthermore, several EEG studies on 
artistic creativity have shown increased alpha activity in the right hemisphere (Fink, 
Graif, & Neubauer, 2009; Martindale et al., 1984) and increased right hemispheric 
synchrony in other frequency bands (Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2002, 2005; Petsche et al., 
1997).  Thus, although my findings cannot conclusively support a theory of creativity as 
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occurring in one hemisphere or the other, the increased frontal upper alpha 
synchronization in the right hemisphere I found during musical improvisation indicates a 
special role for the frontal right brain area as implicated in the generation of original 
ideas (Fink & Neubauer, 2006; Grabner et al., 2007), amongst people with high aptitudes 
for creativity (Fink, Grabner et al., 2009), and as subject to development through training 
(Fink et al., 2011).   
 However, in the current study, amongst those with previous FITI, frontal alpha 
synchronization in the left hemisphere was positively correlated with frontal alpha 
synchronization in the right hemisphere.  This correlation shows that for those with 
previous FITI, although task related changes in frontal alpha synchronization were 
significant and substantially greater in the right hemisphere, upper alpha synchronization 
increased in the left hemisphere as well.  Thus it can be stated that although frontal upper 
alpha synchronization was substantially greater in the right hemisphere, it increased 
simultaneously across both hemispheres for all tasks.  This finding is in accord with the 
line of research that has shown that “interhemispheric interaction and integration is vital 
to creativity” (Lindell, 2011, p. 493). 
 Experience, alpha synchronization, and creativity.  Amongst musicians without 
previous FITI, frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere was 
moderately negatively correlated with both musicians’ music and improvisation 
experience.  These correlations were especially evident between frontal upper alpha 
synchronization occurring during improvisation and both music and improvisation 
experience.  Conversely, amongst those with previous FITI these correlations were not 
evident.  These findings show that amongst musicians without previous FITI, those with 
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more music and improvisation experience exhibit less frontal upper alpha 
synchronization in the right hemisphere while playing back and while improvising 
melodies.  I interpret this as a lack of immersion in the spontaneous processing mode.  
This may suggest that as musicians gain experience they become set in processing 
musical ideas from the deliberate mode.  Their lexicons of musical phrases and 
theoretical knowledge may increase over time, however they may approach performance 
from an analytical, logical, and rational processing mode.  This further suggests that in 
general, spontaneous processing is an ability or skill developed through FITI.  I call this 
spontaneous processing ability.  This ability is not typically learned independently or 
intuitively, but rather it requires nurturing; one manner of training that the current study 
shows is effective in the nurturing of spontaneous processing ability is FITI.  This finding 
is supportive of Gagné’s (2005) differentiated model of gifts and talents.  In this model, 
Gagné (2005) explained that strong aptitudes are developed into skills and talents through 
learning and practice.  The most formalized form of such aptitude development is formal 
institutional learning. 
Alternate Uses Test 
My second aim in this study was to investigate whether frontal upper alpha 
synchronization during music tasks of high and low creative demands is related to 
musicians’ aptitudes for creativity.  To operationalize this aim I measured musicians’ 
aptitudes for creativity using two Alternate Uses Test scales: ideational fluency and 
originality.  Next, I correlated the scores on these measures with frontal upper alpha 
synchronization in the right hemisphere occurring while musicians improvised, played 
back, and listened to melodies and I did this for those with FITI and those without.  I 
93 
 
aimed to answer the question: Is spontaneous processing ability related to a person’s 
aptitude for creativity, and is this relationship subject to a person’s previous FITI?  
Additionally, I used these correlations as measures of construct validity for the Alternate 
Uses Test fluency and originality subscales.  Correlations of these measures with frontal 
upper alpha synchronization during improvisation would suggest that fluency and 
originality measure similar components of creativity.  Conversely, a correlation of only 
one of these measures with frontal upper alpha synchronization would suggest that 
fluency and originality measure different components of creativity or perhaps different 
constructs altogether.  Alternatively, this finding could suggest that one of the subscales 
is better at measuring creative aptitude, and is preferable for use in future research on 
creative cognition and on spontaneous processing ability.  
 Correlation of fluency and originality with alpha synchronization.  I ran 
correlations between Alternate Uses Test fluency and originality and frontal upper alpha 
synchronization in the right hemisphere of musicians while they listened to, played back, 
and improvised melodies.  I hypothesized that both fluency and originality would 
positively correlate with frontal upper alpha synchronization during improvisation to a 
greater degree than during melody playback and during the listening condition.  I 
interpreted that these potential correlations, between frontal upper alpha synchronization 
during improvisation and fluency and originality, would suggest that aptitudes for 
creativity predict spontaneous processing ability (i.e., creative state ability).   
In the non-FITI group both fluency and originality were not related to frontal 
upper alpha synchronization while musicians listened to, played back, and improvised 
melodies.  Also, for both the FITI and non-FITI groups fluency was not related to frontal 
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upper alpha synchronization during any of the music tasks.  Likewise, in the FITI group 
originality was not related to frontal upper alpha synchronization occurring while 
musicians listened to and played back melodies.  However, in the FITI group originality 
moderately correlated with frontal upper alpha synchronization occurring while 
musicians improvised melodies.  In short, originality correlated with frontal upper alpha 
synchronization during improvisation but not during the less creative tasks, and only for 
those with previous FITI.  Given Dietrich’s (2004a) theory that frontal alpha 
synchronization signifies spontaneous processing, I interpret this finding to show that 
musicians with aptitudes for original thinking with previous FITI tended to enter into the 
spontaneous processing mode while improvising melodically; these musicians 
demonstrated increased spontaneous processing ability.   
The above findings suggest that Alternate Uses Test originality is a better 
indicator of creative state ability and perhaps of creativity than is Alternate Uses Test 
fluency.  This finding is important because many researchers have used fluency and not 
originality to measure divergent thinking (e.g., Fink, Graif, & Neubauer, 2009; Jauk et 
al., 2012; Martindale & Hines, 1975, Martindale et al., 1984).  Thus, although it is a more 
time-consuming endeavor involving multiple parties rating ideas on originality, 
researchers should prefer originality as an indicator of divergent thinking and of creative 
aptitude for future research. 
 FITI group differences in fluency and originality.  T-tests for independent 
samples showed that musicians with and without previous FITI did not significantly 
differ on their scores of fluency and of originality.  I hypothesized that scores of fluency 
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and originality may be subject to previous FITI, however previous FITI alone did not 
have an effect on scores of these two aptitude measures. 
These findings support previous research showing that aptitudes themselves are 
stable personality traits (Feist, 1998; Feist & Barron, 2003).  If fluency and originality 
scores had been associated with previous FITI, this would suggest that aptitudes are 
related to environmental influences to a greater degree than to heritable influences.  The 
above findings show the opposite: that education, a presumably affective environmental 
influence, is not related to aptitudes for creativity on its own.  This finding is in accord 
with previous longitudinal studies suggesting that the personality traits of creative people 
remain stable over time (Feist, 1998; Feist & Barron, 2003).   
Interestingly, t-tests for independent samples disclosed that those with previous 
FITI and those without previous FITI did not differ on scores of fluency and of 
originality.  However, in the FITI group, originality correlated with frontal upper alpha 
synchronization during improvisation whereas in the non-FITI group it did not.  This may 
indicate that an aptitude for originality predicts musicians’ spontaneous processing ability 
when this aptitude has been nurtured through FITI.  Furthermore, this correlation may 
provide confirmatory evidence that frontal upper alpha synchronization is related to 
creative cognition and not to another non-related phenomenon.   
 Correlation of fluency and originality.  For both the FITI and non-FITI groups I 
ran correlations to identify the degree to which fluency and originality scores were 
related to one another.  I predicted that the two measures would highly correlate to one 
another.  Results from both FITI and non-FITI groups showed that fluency and originality 
were correlated, with a medium effect size.  In other words, people who scored highly on 
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originality also tended to score highly on fluency.  This was congruent with my 
hypothesis and may suggest that the two scales measure a similar aspect of creativity, 
however, the fact that these correlations were not stronger suggests at least some 
variability in their scores and that each subscale also measures something different.  
 Correlation of fluency and originality with experience.  I ran correlations to 
investigate the relationship between aptitudes for creativity as measured by Alternate 
Uses Test fluency and originality and age, music experience, and improvisation 
experience for both FITI and non-FITI groups.  I predicted that environmental factors 
would moderately to strongly relate with creative aptitudes although these aptitudes are 
partly explained by genetics (Feist, 1998).  In other words, I hypothesized that as a 
person’s experience and age increased so would that person’s creative aptitude.  Contrary 
to this hypothesis, there were no significant correlations between fluency or originality 
and age, music experience or improvisation experience.  These findings may indirectly 
support previous research showing that divergent thinking and originality are aptitudes 
that can be conceptualized as stable personality traits less subject to environmental 
influences than to genetics (Feist, 1998; Feist & Barron, 2003; Penke, 2003). 
Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire 
The third aim of this study was to investigate whether immersion in the creative 
mental state as signified by frontal upper alpha synchronization during spontaneous 
composition predicts the quality of spontaneously composed performances.  I ran 
correlations between frontal upper alpha synchronization occurring while musicians 
improvised melodies and their scores on the Musical Improvisation Performance 
Questionnaire for those with and without previous FITI.  I hypothesized that frontal upper 
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alpha synchronization occurring while musicians improvise melodies would predict the 
quality of their improvised performances and that this relationship would exist for those 
with previous FITI and not for those without.  Namely, I predicted that amongst those 
with previous FITI, frontal upper alpha synchronization during improvisation would 
predict more innovative performances that would be technically better and more musical, 
and that experts would have a better overall impression of these performances. 
 FITI group differences in Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire 
scores.  T-tests for independent samples showed that musicians with and without FITI 
did not significantly differ on the quality of their created products as rated by domain 
experts using the Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire.  These findings 
suggest that previous FITI in itself is not related to the quality of musicians’ improvised 
performances.  They further suggest that the quality of musicians’ improvised 
performances is related to factors other than FITI or to interactions of FITI with other 
factors.  I investigated what these factors might be and will describe the results below. 
 Relationship of alpha synchronization and Musical Improvisation 
Performance Questionnaire scores.  I ran correlations between frontal upper alpha 
synchronization in the right hemisphere occurring while musicians improvised melodies 
and Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire scores to determine the 
relationship between musicians’ neural activity occurring during spontaneous 
composition and the quality of the products created thereupon.  I hypothesized that 
frontal upper alpha synchronization would positively correlate with Musical 
Improvisation Performance Questionnaire scores.  Although it is plausible that success or 
failure on a performance would affect frontal brain activity on subsequent performance, it 
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is impossible for the quality of performances to affect neural activity that occurred 
previously while a person was performing.  Thus, such a correlation can only be one in 
which brain activity predicts performance quality; in other words, such a correlation 
suggests directionality of effect.  Supportive of this line of reasoning, Feist (1998) 
reviewed longitudinal studies on the chronological order of personality and creativity and 
found no evidence that creative achievement determined subsequent personality traits.  
Thus, my hypothesis was that frontal upper alpha synchronization would predict Musical 
Improvisation Performance Questionnaire scores. 
In the non-FITI group there were no significant correlations between any of the 
Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire measures and frontal upper alpha 
synchronization in the right hemisphere occurring while musicians listened to, played 
back, or improvised melodies.  Conversely, in the FITI group there were several positive 
medium sized correlations between frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right 
hemisphere and Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire measures including 
correlations with Musicality, subscales total scores, and overall full measure scores.  
These correlations indicate that frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right 
hemisphere predicts the quality of improvised performances for those with previous FITI.  
These findings are in accord with previous research that has shown frontal alpha 
synchronization to be related to the originality of ideas generated during divergent 
thinking tasks (Fink & Neubauer, 2006; Grabner et al., 2007). 
Given the findings from this and the above mentioned studies, I interpret the 
correlations of frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere and Musical 
Improvisation Performance Questionnaire scores to show that for those with previous 
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FITI, immersion in the spontaneous processing mode tends to yield higher quality 
spontaneous compositions that are rated as being better overall by domain experts.  
 Relationship of aptitudes and MIPQ scores.  I ran correlations between Alternate 
Uses Test fluency and originality and Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire 
scores to determine the relationship between musicians’ aptitudes for creativity and the 
quality of their improvised performances.  I predicted that aptitudes for creativity would 
correlate with Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire scores, and that this 
correlation would be greater for those with previous FITI than for those without.  In other 
words, I hypothesized that FITI would catalyze the development of aptitudes for 
creativity into domain specific talents as evident in created products.   
In the non-FITI group there were no significant correlations between either 
Alternate Uses Test originality or fluency and Musical Improvisation Performance 
Questionnaire scores.  Likewise, in the FITI group there were also no significant 
correlations between fluency and Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire 
scores, however there were medium-sized to strong correlations between originality and 
all Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire subscales, subscale total scores, 
and overall measure scores.  In accord with my hypotheses, these correlations indicate 
that aptitude for originality is related to the quality of created products for those with 
previous FITI and not for those without.  Also, the finding that fluency does not correlate 
with Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire scores while originality does 
supports my suggestion that Alternate Uses Test originality is a better indicator of 
creative aptitude than is fluency. 
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These findings, in addition to the results showing that frontal upper alpha 
synchronization in the right hemisphere during improvisation predicts performance 
quality, and that frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere during 
improvisation is related to aptitude for originality, suggest that aptitude may mediate the 
relationship of frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere and 
performance quality amongst musicians with previous FITI.  I explored this potential 
mediating relationship and describe it below. 
Partial Correlation 
The fourth and final aim of this study was to investigate the role of aptitude for 
creativity as a mediator of the relationship between frontal upper alpha synchronization 
occurring while musicians improvise and the quality of their improvised performances.  I 
ran a partial correlation to determine the relationship between frontal upper alpha 
synchronization in the right hemisphere during Improvisation and Musical Improvisation 
Performance Questionnaire scores while controlling for Alternate Uses Test originality.  
Given the literature showing that frontal alpha synchronization is related to originality of 
ideas (Fink & Neubauer, 2008; Grabner et al., 2007) and to aptitudes for creativity (Fink, 
Grabner, et al., 2009; Fink. Graif, & Neubauer, 2009; Jausovec, 2000; Razumnikova, 
2007), and Gagné’s (2005) explanation that aptitudes are developed into talents through 
formal institutional training, I predicted that for those with previous FITI, aptitude for 
creativity would mediate the predictive relationship between musicians’ frontal upper 
alpha synchronization and the quality of their created products.  I did not however have a 
clear idea of the degree to which this mediating relationship would manifest nor was I 
fully confident that the effect would reach statistical significance. 
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The partial correlation showed that for musicians with previous FITI, the 
correlation of frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere occurring while 
musicians improvised melodies and the quality of their created products was mediated by 
their aptitude for originality.  This finding supports Gagné (2005) who theorized that 
aptitudes of different kinds are developed into talents through practice and training, with 
the most structured form of training being formal institutional training.  Specifically, my 
findings suggest that formal institutional training in improvisation acts as a catalyst for 
the development of creative gifts (e.g., aptitude for originality) into creative talents (e.g., 
musical improvisation ability) observable in the quality of created products (e.g., 
improvised performances).  In short, formal institutional training makes a difference in 
the nurturing and development of creativity, but the aptitude to be creative is a necessary 
trait that must be present in the first place.  When both of these factors are present, 
individuals tend to have high spontaneous processing ability and more readily enter into 
the creative mental state from which they create products that are qualitatively better as 
judged by field experts.  
Implications of the Current Study 
Teaching creativity in formal institutions.  Based on the task-related 
differences in upper alpha synchronization between tasks of high and low creativity 
demands, I conclude that creativity can be conceptualized as a distinct mental state.  This 
finding may have implications for the way in which creativity education can be 
approached both in and out of formal institutions.  Firstly, educators may nurture 
creativity by recognizing it as a distinct mental state and by using pedagogical methods 
that facilitate and support immersion in such a state.  Broadly, this entails incorporating 
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process-oriented pedagogies where learners are provided with the knowledge and skills 
of how to enter and remain in the spontaneous processing mode.  Process-oriented 
pedagogy is a style of teaching that focuses on facilitation of mental processes and states 
(Littlewood, 2009).  Examples of process-oriented teaching strategies include project 
work, task-based instruction, descriptive assessment, and other forms of experiential 
learning (e.g., process writing).  Advantages of process-oriented learning include transfer 
of skills across domains and contexts, increased student autonomy, and increased student 
motivation (Littlewood, 2009).  Further, teachers may provide the environmental 
conditions that are conducive to and that support such a state.  Mentor-student type 
educational approaches are recommended whereby teachers approach learners that are in 
the spontaneous processing mode and provide guidance.  For example, a student of 
theatrical directing may be encouraged to direct a monologue scene.  During this activity 
the teacher can observe and then join the student.  The student can describe his/her 
process, and the teacher can share how s/he might have approached the scenario 
themselves.  In this manner the teacher encourages the student to immerse in the 
spontaneous processing mode, observes, and provides guidance. 
Educators may also choose to structure classes and activities to enable the 
spontaneous processing mode.  Here, the role of the teacher shifts towards that of a 
facilitator of mental states.  I call this a mental state based teaching model.  In such a 
model the teacher organizes class time to enable different mental states including the 
creative state, the logical-rational state, and perhaps other states as well (e.g., meditative).  
In my own teaching experiences in formal institutions, I have observed a lack of 
awareness that these states occur.  Furthermore, I estimate that the majority of current 
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formal institutional educational practices facilitate mostly the logical-rational mental state 
with the creative mental state left unattended and underdeveloped in learners. 
Lateralization of creativity.  In the current study, the creative mental state was 
observed in EEGs as upper alpha synchronization occurring over frontal cortical sites.  
Such synchronization was most evident in the right hemisphere, however as 
synchronization increased in the right it increased in the left as well.  Recently, the notion 
of the right brain being the locus of creativity has been regarded as a neuromyth (Lindell, 
2011; Lindell & Kidd, 2011), as a line of research indicates that creativity “results from 
the interaction and integration of information from both the left and right hemispheres” 
(Lindell, 2011, p. 480).  However, my findings along with those from recent research on 
alpha activity during artistic creativity have shown that the right hemisphere may be 
implicated in tasks involving spontaneous processing (Dietrich & Kanso, 2010).  This has 
implications for the understanding of creative cognition and also calls for further 
investigations on the distinctive role of the frontal right brain areas during different types 
of creativity.  Also, in the current study two-way repeated measures ANOVA showed 
main effects for hemisphere but these effects were only significant at the 0.1 level.  This 
miss of statistical significance may be attributable to sample size, therefore future 
research replicating this study with a larger sample is recommended to investigate if 
statistically significant hemispheric differences occur without FITI. 
Nurturing creative versus logical-rational mental states in music.  For 
musicians without previous FITI, age and experience negatively correlated with frontal 
upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere during musical improvisation.  I 
interpreted this to show that for those without FITI, age and experience were related to a 
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decreased propensity to enter into the spontaneous processing mode.  This suggests that 
without receiving training on how to be creative, musicians may become less creative and 
more logical-rational as they gain experience.  Future research on this tendency is 
needed.  For example, a potential study could investigate whether experience and 
education in creatively constrained musical genres (e.g., classical) leads to decreased 
spontaneous processing ability and less innovative products than does experience and 
education in creatively non-constrained genres (e.g., jazz).  Further, this negative 
correlation of age and experience with frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right 
hemisphere during improvisation amongst those without previous FITI has implications 
for the teaching of creativity.  It suggests that without training in improvisation, 
musicians become less creative and operate from a less creative mental state.  When 
improvising, musicians without FITI may be more logical, perhaps calling on their 
semantic knowledge of music theory and of pre-rehearsed phrases that they know would 
work over specific chord changes.  Thus, if music teachers wish to develop learners’ 
creative aptitudes they may choose to teach spontaneous processing skills thereby 
facilitating the creative mental state during lessons.  Conversely, for some styles of music 
and for some musicians it may be desirable to nurture a logical-rational mental state (i.e., 
deliberate processing ability) during performance.  In such cases avoiding FITI may be 
preferable.  Future EEG research is needed to see if the absence of FITI is related to the 
increased beta band activity that is typically associated with logical-rational thought 
processing.  More conventionally though, musicians wishing to nurture their own creative 
aptitudes can be confident that FITI will yield spontaneous processing ability and better 
quality improvised performances.   
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Nurturing aptitudes for creativity.  Fluency and originality scores were not 
related to previous FITI or to age or experience.  This suggests that aptitudes for 
creativity are stable traits not associated with education for every person.  However, 
originality was related to musicians’ spontaneous processing ability during improvisation 
as signified by frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere, for those with 
previous FITI and not for those without.  This shows that although aptitudes for creativity 
have been found to be stable traits for most people (Feist, 1998), for those with high 
aptitude for originality the nurturing of these aptitudes may occur through FITI and may 
typically not be learned independently (e.g., without formal training). 
This has implications for education in that it suggests that resources may be 
efficiently allocated towards identifying learners with aptitudes for creativity and 
providing them with FITI.  This implication is especially relevant for the education of 
creatively gifted students.  Creatively gifted students need to have their gifts nurtured if 
these are to manifest into talents, and FITI is an effective pathway for the development of 
these gifts.  Policy makers interested in developing student creativity and innovation may 
therefore profit from investing in FITI for creatively gifted students.  Future research can 
explore the relationships between aptitudes for creativity and both spontaneous 
processing ability and created product quality in samples composed solely of creatively 
gifted artists. 
Creative aptitude may be a have or have-not trait requiring nurturing in order to 
manifest into talent.  This could imply that in addition to there being people with high 
aptitudes for creativity there are also people with low or average aptitudes.  For these 
people, training in improvisation will likely not yield statistically significant increases in 
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spontaneous processing ability or the novelty and innovativeness of their created 
products.   
Measurement of creativity.  Although Alternate Uses Test fluency and 
originality may measure similar aspects of the construct of creativity, results from the 
current study have shown that originality is a better predictor of spontaneous processing 
ability and created product quality.  Thus, originality may be a more effective measure of 
aptitude for creativity than is fluency and should be the preferred Alternate Uses Test 
measure for future studies on creative cognition and perhaps on creativity in general.  
Additional research is needed to investigate the relationships of these two aptitude 
measures under different conceptualizations of creativity and for samples of different 
types of artists. 
Also, the success of the Alternate Uses Test originality measure, in conjunction 
with the Consensual Assessment Technique, in predicting spontaneous processing ability 
and quality of products shows that Alternate Uses Test originality may be a valuable 
component of assessment batteries used to identify learners with aptitudes for creativity 
in educational settings.  However, further research is needed on larger samples and with 
participants from across varied artistic and non-artistic domains in order to gain 
confidence in the discriminant validity of this measure for high-stakes decisions such as 
the placement of creatively gifted students in curriculum acceleration programs. 
Nurturing innovation.  The quality of musicians’ created products was not 
related to previous FITI alone, however for those with previous FITI, the quality of 
created products correlated with their aptitudes for creativity.  Furthermore, amongst 
musicians with FITI, immersion in the creative state yielded higher quality products as 
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mediated by aptitude for creativity.  These findings suggest that FITI does not typically 
lead to significantly better products, but that for those with aptitudes for creativity FITI 
nurtures these aptitudes into developed talents.  Further, these findings show that through 
FITI people with aptitudes for creativity develop spontaneous processing ability and that 
immersion in the spontaneous processing mode yields better products. 
These findings further imply that creativity and innovation can be taught to those 
with aptitudes for creativity and may imply that training is in fact necessary in order to 
nurture in-born predispositions towards creativity.  These findings also illustrate that 
immersion in the creative state has high cultural and economic value because it yields 
better products.  This supports my earlier recommendation that if educators wish to 
increase students’ innovation they should identify those with aptitudes for creativity and 
provide them with FITI and with opportunities to immerse in the spontaneous processing 
mode. 
Limitations  
The limitations of this study are related to the method and procedure that were 
used, the nature of my interpretations of upper alpha synchronization, the size and nature 
of the sample, and the kind of the information the data analyses yielded. 
The primary data collection method that I employed was EEG.  Although EEG 
has high temporal accuracy it is limited in its spatial accuracy and in its ability to isolate 
specific areas over the scalp (Arden, Chavez, Grazioplene, & Jung, 2010).  Also, EEG 
electrodes measure electrical current at the surface of the scalp after conductance through 
brain matter that vary in density (Arden et al., 2010).  Thus, the spatial accuracy of EEG 
is limited.  Although I have described upper alpha-band activity as occurring in frontal 
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brain areas and in the left and right hemispheres, such spatial claims may therefore call 
for caution when being interpreted.  
The second measure that I employed involved a divergent thinking test called the 
Alternate Uses Test.  Divergent thinking tests have been a cornerstone of the 
psychometric measurement of creativity for over half a century (Plucker & Makel, 2010).  
As mentioned above, Alternate Uses Test fluency is scored as the sum of ideas given in 
response to a prompt, with higher quantities of responses signifying greater creativity.  
However, the question remains as to whether sheer quantity of responses signifies 
creativity, a separate cognitive ability (e.g., general intelligence), or a cognitive ability 
that is necessary for creativity but not sufficient in itself (e.g., imagination).  Conversely, 
there appears to be less controversy about whether Alternate Uses Test originality 
measures creative ability because originality measures a person’s tendency towards 
unique and unusual ideation, the very definition of normative creativity.  Therefore, when 
considering the usefulness of Alternate Uses Test fluency and originality for measuring 
creative ability, examining the psychometric characteristics and specifically the 
predictive validity of these measures is informative. 
 The reliability of divergent thinking tests, including the Alternate Uses Test is 
high (Runco & Albert, 1985) and the concurrent validity of divergent thinking tests are 
satisfactory (Plucker & Makel, 2010), however there is variation in opinions on whether 
divergent thinking tests predict real-world creative achievement (Plucker & Makel, 
2010).  Researchers studying the predictive validity of divergent thinking tests have 
typically assessed associations between divergent thinking test scores and the quantity, 
but not quality of creative achievements (Runco, 1986b).  Consequently, Runco (1986a) 
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suggested the use of creative attainment indicators that measure quality and not only 
quantity.  In the current study this criticism was addressed through the use of expert 
ratings of the quality of participants’ improvised performances.  Recall that experts rated 
improvised performances using the Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire 
and that findings supported the predictive validity of Alternate Uses Test originality but 
not fluency.   
 Although sometimes criticized for their predictive validity, divergent thinking 
tests including the Alternate Uses Test have been extensively evaluated (Plucker & 
Makel, 2010) and remain a popular psychometric measure of creativity (Kaufman, 
Plucker, & Baer, 2008).  They also remain popular in neuroscientific studies of creative 
cognition, with researchers using the Alternate Uses Test in a number of recent studies on 
the EEG correlates of creative cognition (e.g., Fink, Graif, & Neubauer, 2009; Jauk et al., 
2012).  However, the predictive validity of divergent thinking tests remains a source of 
contention in the research community (Plucker & Makel, 2010).  Therefore, continued 
research testing the predictive validity of the Alternate Uses Test, especially using 
ecologically valid creative attainment indicators (e.g., expert ratings of creative products), 
is suggested.  
In addition to criticisms of their psychometric properties, divergent thinking tests 
have also been criticized for being influenced by coaching and intervention effects 
(Clapham, 1996; Hattie, 1980; Torrance, 1972a, 1988).  In the current study I addressed 
this criticism by consistently providing only a minimal instruction of “come up with as 
many uses as you can” to participants during the Alternate Uses Test phase of the 
experimental procedure. 
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In this paper I interpreted increased task-related frontal upper alpha 
synchronization in the right hemisphere as evidence of a distinct mental state occurring 
during creative cognition and characterized by internal focus of attention, suppression of 
external stimuli, and top-down processing.  My interpretations were founded on previous 
research (Berkowitz, 2007; Berliner, 1994; Buzsaki & Draguhn, 2004; Klimesch et al., 
2007; Nardone, 1997; Nelson & Rawlings, 2007; Ward, 2003) however it is possible that 
the increased frontal upper alpha synchronization that I found signifies cognitive 
processes not related to creativity.  For example, in the current study frontal alpha 
synchronization in the right hemisphere increased with increasing creativity demands of 
music tasks, however it is plausible that the increased upper alpha synchronization was 
related to increases in general internal focusing demands and not demands specific to 
creative cognition.  On the other hand, it is reasonable to infer that internal focus of 
attention is at least a part of creative cognition.  Therefore, future research that isolates 
the different possible processes underlying frontal upper alpha synchronization during 
creative and non-creative cognition during ecologically valid artistic tasks is 
recommended so that experts in the domain can soon agree on whether the processes 
underlying frontal upper alpha synchronization are creativity related or general. 
The sample that I recruited for this study consisted of 22 musicians who were 
categorized into non-FITI and FITI groups of 12 and 10 participants.  Given the size of 
these groups, the fact that findings were statistically significant emphasizes the 
importance of these findings, however, a limitation of this study’s sample is that it 
consisted solely of musicians.  Although I refer to the participants at times as artists and 
as people, the generalizability of these findings may be limited to populations of 
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musicians.  Accordingly, future research is needed to conduct similar studies on samples 
of other types of artists (e.g., writers, visual artists, dancers) and other types of creative 
people (e.g., mathematicians, scientists, engineers, computer programmers).  
Additionally, the sample consisted of adults between the ages of 18 and 55.  This choice 
was made in order to minimize the effects of neurological maturation, specifically the 
development of the prefrontal cortex that is amongst the last brain structures to reach 
adult development (Chiron et al., 1992; Chugani et al., 1987).  Although the educational 
and developmental implications of the current study are potentially impactful, they may 
be generalizable only to adults.  In future, researchers can address this limitation by 
conducting similar investigations on groups at different stages of development (e.g., early 
childhood, late childhood, early adolescence).  Although challenging, such research 
would shed light on the development of creativity and on limitations in spontaneous 
processing ability at certain ages that may exist due to the lack of prefrontal cortex 
development characteristic of earlier stages of maturation.  If spontaneous processing 
ability improves with the progression of developmental stages, such research may also 
indirectly confirm the role of the prefrontal cortex in deliberate and spontaneous 
processing modes.  Thus, future research replicating this study on larger and more diverse 
samples is recommended. 
I ran a number of within-group Pearson product moment correlations in this study 
which yielded information about the relationship between pairs of variables within 
distinct groups (Marzban et al., 2013), however, the interpretations of these correlations 
were limited to the bounds of the groups.  Thus, correlations were not compared between 
groups in the current study.  For example, I did not state that the correlation of frontal 
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upper alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere occurring while musicians 
improvised melodies and Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire scores was 
greater amongst those with FITI than those without.  I was limited to stating that the 
correlation was evident for those with FITI and not evident for those without. 
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CHAPTER 5: Summary and Conclusions 
 My primary aim in this study was to investigate differences in frontal brain 
activity occurring between tasks with high and low creativity demands.  I hypothesized 
that musicians would show increased frontal upper alpha band activity during tasks with 
high creative demands compared to those with low creative demands, and that this effect 
would be more evident in those with previous FITI than those without.  Confirming my 
hypothesis, amongst those with previous FITI, upper alpha synchronization was greater 
while musicians improvised than while they played back and listened to melodies.  I 
interpreted this as evidence of a creative mental state characterized by spontaneous 
processing, and by top-down processing and internal focus of attention.  The increased 
frontal upper alpha synchronization that occurred in the right hemisphere during musical 
improvisation supports previous research implicating the frontal right brain area in 
creative ideation (Fink & Neubauer, 2006; Grabner et al., 2007), amongst people with 
high aptitudes for creativity (Fink, Grabner, et al., 2009), and as subject to development 
through training (Fink et al., 2011).  Although the task-related differences in 
synchronization that I observed amongst those with previous FITI occurred in the right 
hemisphere, synchronization in the right correlated with synchronization in the left.  
Additionally, amongst musicians without previous FITI, music and improvisation 
experience correlated with decreased frontal upper alpha synchronization in the right 
hemisphere while playing back and improvising melodies.  I interpreted this correlation 
as signifying an absence of spontaneous processing amongst those without previous FITI. 
 My second aim in this study was to investigate the relationship between frontal 
upper alpha synchronization during music tasks of high and low creativity demands and 
aptitudes for creativity.  I hypothesized that both fluency and originality would positively 
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correlate with frontal upper alpha synchronization during improvisation to a greater 
degree than during melody playback and during the listening condition.  This hypothesis 
was partially confirmed, as originality correlated with frontal upper alpha 
synchronization during improvisation but not during the tasks with lower creative 
demands and only for those with previous FITI, while fluency did not correlate with 
frontal upper alpha synchronization during any tasks for either those with or without 
previous FITI.  I interpreted this to show that musicians with aptitudes for original 
thinking with previous FITI tended to spontaneously process thoughts while improvising.  
These findings indirectly suggest that Alternate Uses Test originality is a better indicator 
of creative state ability and of creativity than is fluency.  Thus, future researchers should 
prefer originality as an indicator of divergent thinking and of aptitude for creativity. 
 Musicians with and without previous FITI did not significantly differ on their 
scores of fluency and of originality.  These findings indicate that education may not be 
related to aptitudes for creativity on their own.  Delving deeper, in the FITI group, 
originality correlated with frontal upper alpha synchronization during improvisation 
whereas in the non-FITI group it did not.  This may indicate that when nurtured through 
FITI, aptitude for originality is associated with musicians’ spontaneous processing 
ability.  There were no significant correlations between fluency or originality and age, 
music experience or improvisation experience.  This may indirectly support previous 
research framing divergent thinking and originality as stable aptitudes or personality 
traits (Feist, 1998). 
 My third aim in this study was to investigate whether frontal upper alpha 
synchronization occurring during improvisation predicts quality of improvised 
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performances.  I hypothesized that frontal upper alpha synchronization occurring while 
musicians improvise melodies would predict the quality of their improvised performances 
and that this relationship would exist for those with previous FITI and not for those 
without.  This hypothesis was confirmed.  In the FITI group, frontal upper alpha 
synchronization in the right hemisphere correlated with Musical Improvisation 
Performance Questionnaire scores.  I interpreted these correlations to show that for those 
with previous FITI, immersion in the spontaneous processing mode tends to yield higher 
quality improvised performances.  In the FITI group, originality correlated with all 
Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire measures.  These correlations indicate 
that for those with previous FITI aptitude for originality is associated with the quality of 
created products.   
 My fourth and final aim of this study was to investigate the role of aptitude for 
creativity as a mediator of the relationship between frontal alpha synchronization 
occurring while musicians improvise and the quality of their improvised performances.  I 
hypothesized that for musicians with previous FITI, aptitude for creativity would mediate 
the relationship between frontal upper alpha synchronization during improvisation and 
the quality of improvised performances.  Confirming this hypothesis, a partial correlation 
analysis showed that for those with previous FITI, the relationship of frontal upper alpha 
synchronization in the right hemisphere during improvisation and the quality of created 
products was mediated by aptitude for originality.  In accord with Gagné’s (2005) 
differentiated model of gifts and talents, this finding suggests that formal institutional 
training in improvisation acts as a pathway for the development of creative gifts (e.g., 
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aptitude for originality) into creative talents (e.g., musical improvisation ability) 
observable in the quality of created products (e.g., improvised performances). 
 It is my hope that the findings from this study will provide neuroscientific data to 
inform policy, curriculum, and pedagogy geared towards nurturing creativity in learning 
environments.  It is also my hope that the data from this study will add to a growing 
research base on the neural correlates of artistic creativity by employing a neuroscientific 
method best-suited to measuring transient brain states: EEG.   
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Appendix B: Recruitment Poster. 
 
  
 
 
 
Volunteers are Required to 
Participate  
 
in a study of musical improvisation   
 
This study aims to investigate how musical improvisation 
affects consciousness state. You must be over the age of 18 and 
be right-handed.  
 
This study will take place at the Brain and Mind Institute at 
Western in the Natural Sciences Centre.  
 
If you are interested or would like more information, please 
contact us at the address below.  
 
You will be compensated $20 for your time.  
  
 
 
 
             
         
 
  
     
Title of Research Project: Musical Improvisation in Adults
 
Investigators: 
Joel Lopata, Ph.D student
Elizabeth Nowicki, PhD 
Marc Joanisse, Ph.D.  
 
 
Information about the study
The study will investigate musical improvisation and how it is related to activity in the 
brain.  You are being asked to participate in this research because you are a musician 
with at least some proficiency playing a piano/keyboard, with 
who is between the ages of 18 and 85.  To be included in this study you must be right 
handed, and have no history of neurological disorder. During this study we will examine 
your brain activity as you play three different pieces o
pictures of a few items. You will be fitted with a cap that contains sensors specially 
designed to monitor your brain activity using an electroencephalogram (EEG). Sensors 
will also be placed on your cheeks, forehead, and nose.
inserted into each sensor. 
 
The main task will involve listening to, playing back, and improvising over three short 
standard pieces of music. The second task will involve naming uses for common items 
and indicating your respon
given the opportunity to practice on a keyboard and we will make sure you feel 
comfortable with the musical progressions.  The study will take 1.5 to 2 hours, and you 
will be compensated $20 fo
 
We hope to discuss the findings of the study at scientific conferences and intend to 
publish them in a professional journal. We expect the study to add to psychologists’ 
understanding of improvisation, creativity, and learning. In the future, this informat
Appendix C: Letter of Information. 
Letter of Information   
  
 
 519-860-0709 (jlopata@uwo.ca) 
519-661-2111 ext. 80186 (enowick2@uwo.ca
519-661-2111 ext. 86582 (marcj@uwo.ca) 
: 
the ability to improvise, 
f music, and also as you see 
 Following this, gel will be 
 
ses orally.  Prior to completing each musical task you will be 
r participating.  
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might help educators to create or incorporate better techniques for teaching improvisation 
and creativity.   
 
Comfort and Safety: 
This is a non-invasive technique and there are no known risks to participating in this 
study. However, the cap is tight fitting and may lead to some slight discomfort. The 
electrode gel is easily washed out of the hair, and we will provide you with shampoo and 
clean towels to do so at the end of the experiment.  
 
Please note participation is voluntary and that you are free to stop participating in the 
study at any time without consequence. You will still receive compensation if you decide 
to stop participating. 
 
You will receive written feedback at the end of the experiment, at which point any 
additional questions you may have will be answered. 
 
Confidentiality: 
All data collected will be coded numerically to ensure your confidentiality. Furthermore, 
no information that might identify you will be shared with anyone outside the research 
team. This consent form will be kept separate from the data collected. Data will be kept 
in a locked room, and viewed only by the researchers. The data will be destroyed after 5 
years (or sooner at your request by contacting Mr. Lopata or Dr. Nowicki).  If we publish 
results of the study, your name will not be used, nor will your data be identifiable (only 
data averaged across will be published). 
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Appendix D: Musical Improvisation Performance Questionnaire (MIPQ). 
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Appendix E: Participant Information Questionnaire. 
Participant Information Questionnaire    
 
Date of Participation (dy/mn/yr): _______________________  
 
Birth Date: ________________________________ 
 
Sex:       M        F 
 
Musical instruments played: 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Years/Months of musical experience: _________________________________________ 
 
Years/Months of improvisational experience: ___________________________________ 
 
Music education: 
  
 Formal programs or courses: __________________________________________ 
 
 Private lessons: _____________________________________________________ 
 
 Self-taught: ________________________________________________________ 
 
 Other: ____________________________________________________________ 
 
Formal improvisation education: 
  
 Formal programs or courses: __________________________________________ 
 
 Private lessons: _____________________________________________________ 
 
 Self-taught: ________________________________________________________ 
 
 Other: ____________________________________________________________ 
 
History of Musical Performance: _________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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History of Improvisational Performance: _____________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Would you describe yourself as a classical musician, a jazz musician, both, or neither? 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix F: Alternate Uses Test Item Images. 
Participants were shown images and given the opportunity to generate ideas about their 
possible uses for three minutes per item. 
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Appendix G: Music Charts. 
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Appendix H: Debriefing Form. 
 
Debriefing Form 
Musical Improvisation in Adults 
 
This experiment is part of an exploration into how people’s states of consciousness 
change during musical improvisation.  Research suggests that when you are creative your 
state of consciousness changes, and that this may be indicated by changes in brain waves 
(Dietrich, 2004; Martindale, 1999; Fink et al., 2009).  However, to date this has only been 
explored using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), or during improvised 
dance and visual art using EEG.  Thus, what is not clear is whether a person’s state of 
consciousness changes when they are improvising musically compared to when they are 
playing in a rote manner.  It is also not clear as to which of predisposition toward 
creativity, or improvisational experience plays a greater role in the ability to enter this 
proposed state of consciousness.  This is a critical question to understanding whether 
people can learn to be creative, and may provide insight into the value of teaching 
creativity in music and in general. 
 
In this study you came up with ideas for uses of common household items and filled out a 
questionnaire regarding your music experience. You also listened to, played back, and 
improvised over three musical passages while we monitored your brain responses using 
an electroencephalogram (EEG). We expect that EEG imaging will show increased alpha 
activity during musical improvisation, and not during a rote musical task. We also predict 
that a person’s creativity will be associated with brain wave activity.  These findings may 
suggest that creativity may be defined as a unique state of consciousness, and that all 
people can learn to be more creative with experience and education. 
 
If you have any further questions regarding this research or theories of improvisation and 
creativity, feel free to contact Joel Lopata at 519-860-0709 or jlopata@uwo.ca, or Dr. 
Elizabeth Nowicki at 519-661-2111 ext. 80186 or enowick2@uwo.ca, or Dr. Marc 
Joanisse at 519-661-2111, ext. 86582 or marcj@uwo.ca. 
 
This study has been approved by the Peer Ethics Review Board in the Department of 
Psychology at Western University. If you have any questions about your rights as a 
research subject, you should contact the Director of the Office of Research Ethics at 
Western: ethics@uwo.ca or 519-661-3036. 
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